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PATRICK v. BURGET: THE FUTURE OF
HOSPITAL PEER REVIEW COMMITTEES IN THE
ANTITRUST ARENA
INTRODUCTION
As health care costs skyrocket' and many facilities close,2 American phy-
sicians compete for a decreasing number of hospital staff positions.3 As a
result, physicians may experience difficulty in obtaining hospital staff priv-
ileges. Because staff privileges are a necessity for a successful practice, this
problem is of concern to physicians.4 In recent years, many physicians who
have had hospital staff privileges either denied or revoked have turned to
1. See Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 11, 1989, at 7, col. 3. In speaking to the annual Blue
Cross and Blue Shield Illinois Health Care Symposium, Former President Gerald R. Ford stated
that Americans spent $550 billion on health care in 1988 (11% of the gross national product).
If the upward trend in health care costs continues, costs will double by 1995 and triple by the
year 2000. See also Hamilton, The Vital Signs Aren't Very Encouraging, Bus. WK., Jan. 11,
1988, at 104. Health care costs increased at a greater rate than the Consumer Price Index
during much of the 1980's. The increase in health care costs has been "gaining momentum
since mid-1987." Id. Furthermore, Medicare reimbursements to hospitals have not kept up with
cost increases. Id. See also Note, Antitrust Implications of Medical Peer Review: Balancing the
Competing Interests, 15 PEPPERDINE L. REV. I11, 111 (1987) (medical costs rising faster than
other production costs).
2. See Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 31, 1988, at 7, col. 4. For example, from 1985 to 1988
ten Chicago hospitals were forced to close their doors. Id.
3. Cowan, Medical Staff Legal Issues, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 851, 852 (1986). Dr. Cowan
discusses the current trends in the hospital environment. He states that the number of physicians
from 1960 to 1985 has increased from 141 to 204 per 100,000 people. Id. However, there has
been a concurrent decline in the number of hospitals. Id. Thus, it follows that an increasing
number of physicians are competing for a decreasing number of hospital positions. Id.
4. See Enders, Federal Antitrust Issues Involved in the Denial of Medical Staff Privileges,
17 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 331, 331 (1986) (exclusion from staff may result in substantial economic
damage to the physician); Note, Quality of Care, Staff Privileges, and Antitrust Law, 64 U.
DET. L. REV. 505, 506 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Quality of Care] (access to hospital needed
for professional survival); Note, Medical Staff Membership Decisions: Judicial Intervention,
1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 473, 474 [hereinafter Note, Medical Staff Decisions] ("a physician without
privileges is almost certain to become a physician without patients") (quoting Goldsmith and
Bertolef, The Present Status of Physician Privileges, 1981 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 121).
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals ("JCAH") defines staff privileges as:
"[p]ermission to provide medical or other patient carte services in the granting institution,
within well-defined limits, based on the individual's professional license and his experience,
competence, ability, and judgment." See JOINT CoMMIssIoN ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS,
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS/1985, at 217 (1984) [hereinafter JCAH MANUAL].
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the courts for relief by filing various claims.' One increasingly common type
of suit is based on alleged violations of the federal antitrust law. 6 In most
instances, physicians have not prevailed in their antitrust challenges to hos-
pital staff privilege decisions. 7 However, the recent Supreme Court decision
in Patrick v. Burget8 suggests this trend might be changing.9
In Patrick v. Burget, an Oregon physician filed a federal antitrust claim
against members of a peer review committee after it revoked his hospital
privileges. The defendants claimed they were immune from liability under
the state action doctrine. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed a Ninth
Circuit decision ° and held that the state action doctrine did not protect
Oregon physicians from federal antitrust liability for their activities on
hospital peer review committees." Patrick is the first Supreme Court decision
to interpret the state action doctrine, an antitrust defense based on state
5. See Groseclose, Hospital Privilege Cases: Braving the Dismal Swamp, 26 S.D.L. REV.
1, 3 (1981). Mr. Groseclose discusses various types of suits that a physician may pursue after
a hospital has either denied or revoked his staff privileges. The first remedy suggested by
Groseclose is judicial review. See infra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
A second type of claim that has been pursued by dissatisfied physicians is one based on
contract theory. See Groseclose, supra, at 25. The contract theory purports that hospital bylaws
comprise a contract between the hospital and the physician. Id. The person denied initial staff
privileges cannot utilize the contract theory since no initial relationship would exist between the
physician and the hospital. Id. at 25-26. The contract theory may be the only viable remedy in
a jurisdiction which prohibits common law judicial review. Id. at 28. However, Groseclose
states the contract theory should be regarded as a reluctant alternative to common law judicial
review. Id. See also Lawler v. Eugene Wuesthoff Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 497 So. 2d 1261,
1263-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (physician sufficiently alleged violation of hospital bylaws
in termination of staff privileges to bring suit for damages for breach of contract); Margolin
v. Morton F. Plant Hosp. Ass'n, 348 So. 2d 57, 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (in course of
revoking physician's privileges, hospital failed to follow its own bylaws, thus allowing breach
of contract action).
A third type of claim that has been advanced by dissatisfied physicians is based on antitrust
concepts. Groseclose, supra, at 28-29. See infra notes 84-106 and accompanying text.
6. Enders, supra note 4, at 331 ("in recent years no single health care industry practice
has been the target of more antitrust lawsuits than hospital's denial of staff privileges").
7. See Goss v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 789 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 1986) (per se rule not
applied to alleged boycott of physician by two hospitals); Smith v. Burns Clinic Medical Center
779 F.2d 1173, 1176 (6th Cir. 1985) (physicians failed to establish prima facie case of monop-
olization or intent to monopolize); Capili v. Shott, 620 F.2d 438, 439 (4th Cir. 1980) (exclusive
contract between anesthesia group and hospital did not substantially effect interstate commerce).
See also Bierig, Peer Review After Patrick, 21 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 135 (June 1988) (likelihood
of physicians prevailing in antitrust claims is remote due to costs of litigation and Health Care
Quality Improvement Act). But see Tambone v. Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County, 825
F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1987) (peer review committee not immune from federal liability under
state action doctrine absent active state supervision).
8. 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
9. N.Y. Times, May 17, 1988, at Al, col. 5. Kirk Johnson, general counsel of the American
Medical Association, stated that in Patrick the Court had allowed "the atom bomb of antitrust
laws" to be used against peer review panels. Id. at D24, col. 4.
10. 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986).
11. 486 U.S. at 105.
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immunity from federal antitrust laws, 12 in the hospital peer review context.
Effective peer review is paramount for quality health care. 3 At first glance,
the Court's decision may appear to discourage physicians from participating
on peer review committees for fear of antitrust liability. 14 However, the
decision may have the opposite effect. By its careful analysis of the state
action doctrine in the peer review setting, the Court has guided state legis-
latures and lower courts on how to immunize good faith peer review from
antitrust liability. 15
This Note will discuss peer review liability for antitrust violations, with
an emphasis on the state action doctrine defense. In the background section,
the Note will review physician staff privileges and the function of peer review
committees. In addition, the background section will review judicial review
of peer review decisions, and discuss possible defenses to antitrust actions.
In that context, the background will discuss state and federal immunity
statutes, briefly exploring the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
198616 as a valuable mechanism for immunizing good faith peer review. The
main thrust of the background will involve a review of the state action
doctrine cases which lead to Patrick. Next, this Note will discuss the Patrick
Court's interpretation of the state action doctrine as a possible defense of
peer review committees against antitrust actions. In the analysis, the Note
will examine the Court's holding that the state action doctrine does not
provide immunity to peer review committees. Finally, the impact section will
focus on the actual effect of Patrick as the lower courts continue to deal
with antitrust attacks on peer review committees.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Nature and Importance of Staff Privileges
A brief discussion of hospital staff privileges is necessary to explain their
importance to a physician. Hospitals and physicians have an interdependent
12. See infra notes 121-59 and accompanying text.
13. The Patrick Court acknowledged the defendants' public policy argument that effective
peer review is essential to quality health care. 486 U.S. at 105. See also Note, Quality of Care,
supra note 4, at 524 (antitrust liability may have chilling effect on quality medical care).
14. See, e.g., Policing Doctor, TiME, May 30, 1988, at 54; Ross, Peer Review in Texas-A
Survey of Medical Staffs, 83 Trx. MED. 91, 92 (Mar. 1987). A recent survey of members of
the Texas Medical Association revealed that fifty-one percent of physicians were somewhat
reluctant to participate in peer review because of the threat of legal liability. Id. But see
Holthaus, Peer Review After Patrick Case is Alive and Well, HOSPITALS, Oct. 20, 1988, at 34
(discussion of several cases handed down after Patrick which extended protection from antitrust
liability to physicians engaged in peer review).
15. See N.Y. Times, May 17, 1988, at D24, col. 4. Kirk Johnson, general counsel of the
American Medical Association, suggested that state hospital licensing laws be amended to
conform with the Patrick decision. Id. See also Bierig, supra note 7, at 135 (risks of antitrust
liability for good faith peer review are not substantial).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (Supp. V 1987).
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relationship.' 7 Hospital staff privileges are an economic necessity to physi-
cians for a number of reasons. 8 One reason is that physicians need a hospital
in which to admit patients either for treatment or diagnostic purposes. 9 In
addition, not only does a denial or revocation of privileges have an immediate
economic impact,20 it may affect the physician's future earning potential.2 '
Finally, staff privileges provide the physician with a mechanism for obtaining
referrals in order to expand their patient base.22 For these reasons, most
physicians depend on staff privileges for a successful medical practice.
Similarly, hospitals need physicians to operate and attract patients. Due
to new trends in health care, 23 hospitals have become big businesses.14 A
physician with a respected reputation in some specialty area brings both
patients and revenue into a hospital. 25 Today, hospital staffing decisions are
based not only on physician competence, 26 but also on the realities of the
17. See Miles & Philp, Hospital Caught in the Antitrust Net: An Overview, 24 DUQ. L.
REv. 489 (1985). The authors describe a hospital as having a tripartite organizational structure.
Id. at 500. The first entity is the board of trustees or board of directors which is comprised of
business persons or community leaders. The overall responsibility of the hospital rests with this
governing board. The second entity within the hospital organizational structure is the hospital
administration, headed by the hospital president. The administration is responsible for the
everyday operation of the hospital and reports to the governing board. Id. at 501. Finally,
there is the medical staff which is responsible for the quality of medical services at the hospital.
Id. See also Spivey, The Relation Between Hospital Management and Medical Staff Under a
Prospective-Payment System, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 984 (1984) (discussion of changing
relationship between hospital administration and medical staff under Medicare prospective-
payment system).
18. See sources cited supra note 4.
19. See Note, Quality of Care, supra note 4, at 506 (access to therapeutic and diagnostic
equipment vital for professional survival).
20. See sources cited supra note 4.
21. See Note, Medical Staff Decisions, supra note 4, at 474.
22. Id. (staff privileges important in establishing patient referral networks).
23. Cowan, supra note 3, at 851-55. Dr. Cowan provides an excellent analysis of the major
trends affecting the delivery of health care in the United States. These trends include: (1) an
increase in the number of physicians but a decrease in the number of available hospital staff
positions; (2) aggressive cost containment policies; (3) the rise of nonphysician practitioners
such as midwifes, psychologists, podiatrists, etc.; (4) the development of alternative health care
delivery systems; (5) technological advances; (6) an aging population with the concurrent rise
in geriatric medicine; and (7) increasing consumer awareness of patients. Id.
24. Health care is a $500 billion industry. For the year ending August 31, 1987, hospital
earnings rose 2.801o to $8 billion. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 104.
25. See Hospitals Pursue New Superstars: Famous Physicians, HOSPITALS, Nov. 20, 1986,
at 78. One big advantage of having a superstar physician on staff is that they fill hospital beds.
For example, Christiaan Barnard, heart transplant pioneer, has helped the Baptist Medical
Center of Oklahoma obtain referrals. Id. See also Millenson, Hospitals Woo Doctors to Win
Their Patients, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 12, 1989, § 7 (Business) at 1, col. 5 (discusses methods
by which hospitals recruit prominent physicians).
26. In addition to the obvious concern for physician competence, these decisions also have
legal significance for hospital governing boards. See Nodzenski, Medical Staff Decisions in
Private Hospitals: The Role of Due Process, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 951 (1987). Hospitals may
be held liable for the actions of their staff physicians. See Darling v. Charleston Community
1990] PATRICK v. BURGET
changing health care market. 27
B. Staff Privileges and Peer Review
The general mechanism by which many hospitals grant initial staff privi-
leges is outlined by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations ("JCAHO"). 2E According to the JCAHO, professional criteria
that hospitals may consider when granting initial staff privileges to a phy-
sician include current licensure, previous experience, competency, and health
status. 29 Hospitals may consider their own needs, as well.3 0 The JCAHO also
provides standards for the renewal of existing privileges for physicians who
are currently on staff."' Reappointment is based on peer recommendations,3 2
departmental and/or major clinical service recommendations," and other
significant factors.14
The JCAHO manual states that one of the factors considered in the
reappointment to the hospital staff or the renewal of clinical privileges is
Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965). See also Trail & Kelley-Claybrook,
Hospital Liability and the Staff Privileges Dilemma, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 315, 339 (1985)
(discussing hospitals' direct corporate liability for staff physicians).
27. See Cowan, supra note 3, at 851-55 (discussing general considerations with regard to
credentialing).
28. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1989) (hereinafter "JCAHO MANUAL"]. The JCAHO was originally
named "The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals" or "JCAH," but in 1987 that
name was changed to reflect the commitment to quality care in all major health care settings.
The JCAHO is a voluntary agency that establishes standards for hospitals. If a hospital conforms
to all JCAHO guidelines, it receives accreditation. Id. at xvii. See also Cowan, supra note 3,
at 857 (discussing 1986 JCAH revisions).
29. JCAHO MANUAL, supra note 28, MS.1.2.3.1.2.2, at 102. JCAHO defines clinical
privileges as "[p]ermission to provide medical or other patient care services in the granting
institution, within well-defined limits, based on the individual's professional license and his
experience, competence, ability, and judgment." Id. at 101. "Appointment to the medical staff
is made through a hospital specific mechanism that is approved and implemented by the medical
staff and the governing body, fully documented in the medical staff bylaws, rules and regula-
tions, and policies, as described to each applicant." Id. MS 1.2 - MS 1.2.3, at 101-02.
Professional criteria that an applicant must meet are specified in the medical staff bylaws. Id.
MS 1.2.3.1.2, at 101-02. The criteria, which include evidence of current competence, and health
status, are applied uniformly to all applicants. Id. MS 1.2.3.1.2.2, at 102.
30. Id. at 110. Decisions to accept applicants may also be influenced by other criteria, such
as: "l) the ability of the hospital to provide adequate facilities and supportive services for the
applicant and his patients; 2) patient care needs for additional staff members with the applicant's
skill and training; 3) current evidence of adequate professional liability insurance; and 4) the
geographic location of the applicant." Id. MS 1.2.3.1.2.3.1-1.2.3.1.2.3.4, at 102.
31. Id. MS 5, at 115.
32. Id. MS 5.4, at 116 (peer recommendations are part of the evaluation process for
reappointment to the medical staff).
33. Id. MS 5.5, at 115.
34. Id. MS 5.3, at 115-16 (factors include "current licensure, health status, professional
performance, judgment and clinical/technical skills, as indicated by the results of the quality
assurance activities and other reasonable indicators of continuing qualification").
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peer review recommendations.35 Peer review committees are composed of
health care professionals.36 The committees may be required by state statute37
and hospital bylaws.38
35. Id. MS 5.4, at 116.
36. D. SUBER, PEER REVIEW: A LEGAL UPDATE 3 (1981). See also Borsody & Tiano, Peer
Review and the Antitrust Laws: An Analysis and a Proposal, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 511 (1982).
Peer review may be voluntary or mandatory in nature. Voluntary peer review is conducted by
a group of health professionals either for self-regulation purposes, or at the request of an
insurer or patient to examine the quality, necessity, or reasonableness of the price of the services
received. Id. at 511. On the other hand, mandatory peer review is required when professional
health care services are paid for by public funds such as under the federal Medicare program.
Id. See Comment, Physician Heal Thyself.- Because the Cure, the Health Care Quality Im-
provement Act, May Be Worse Than the Disease, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 1073 (1988). A physician
is accountable to more than just the state licensure board. He is also accountable to peer review
groups. Id. at 1081. In the hospital setting, a peer review group grants staff privileges as well
as monitors a physician's performance. If a physician fails to meet the requisite standard of
care or fails to comply with hospital regulations, the peer review group may investigate and
discipline the physician. Id.
37. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1-6.5(c) (Burns 1986) states:
The medical staff of a hospital shall be an organized group which shall be
responsible to the governing board for the clinical and scientific work of the hospital,
advice regarding professional matters and policies to the governing board, and shall
have the responsibility of reviewing the professional practices in the hospital for
the purpose of reducing morbidity and mortality, and for the improvement of the
care of patients in the hospital. This review shall include, but shall not be limited
to, the quality and necessity of the care provided patients and the preventability of
complications and deaths occurring in the hospital.
Id.
38. E.g., CHILDREN'S MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS
(1989). Peer review at Children's Memorial Hospital is conducted according to the following
process, as outlined in the medical staff bylaws. After a written complaint has been filed against
a staff member, the Chief-of-Staff, the appropriate Department Head, and the Staff Member
try to agree on a course of action. Id. at 19. If these individuals fail to agree on a course of
action, the Medical Board shall nominate and elect an Ad Hoc Investigative Committee of five
members. Id. article VI, 6.8, at 19-20. The Ad Hoc Investigative Committee conducts an
informal investigation of the allegations in the complaint and submits a written report to the
Medical Board within thirty days. The report recommends to the medical board one of the
following actions:
(1) not to take any corrective action and terminate the proceedings against the Staff
Member;
(2) take one or more corrective actions against the Staff Member including: a) a
warning, letter of admonition, or letter of reprimand, b) probation or requirements
of individual consultation, c) reduction, restriction, suspension, or revocation of
clinical privileges, d) reduction of staff category or limitation of any staff prero-
gatives directly relating to the Staff Members delivery of patient care, e) suspension,
reduction, or revocation of any or all of the Staff Member's clinical privileges, f)
suspension or revocation of staff membership;
(3) approve a Voluntary Settlement Agreement with the Staff Member.
Id. article VI, 6.10-6.12, at 20-22. The Medical Board then decides on corrective action. The
Staff Member is afforded a hearing based upon the Board's decision. Id. article VII, 7.1-7.86,
at 23-30 (discussing formal hearing procedures).
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The goal of a hospital peer review committee is to monitor the quality and
the necessity of medical services rendered by a staff physician. 9
C. Staff Privileges and Judicial Review
A physician who has had his staff privileges initially denied or later revoked
by a hospital may turn to the courts for relief.4 Initially at common law,
whether a physician was entitled to judicial review of a hospital's unfavorable
decision regarding staff privileges depended largely upon whether the hospital
was public or private. 4' That rule remains essentially the same; thus, medical
staffing decisions of public hospitals are subject to judicial review, while
private hospital decisions generally are not.
1. Judicial Review of Public Hospital Decisions
Physicians' claims against public hospitals are usually based on the due
process clauses of the fifth or fourteenth amendments. 42 Like any other
government entity, a public hospital must provide constitutional due process
before depriving a person of constitutionally protected rights. 43 To that end,
a physician who has been denied staff privileges should be given the reason
for his refusal." In its analysis of a claim, a court will determine if a
physician has suffered a substantial denial of liberty or property at the hands
of the public hospital without any due process safeguards. 45
2. Judicial Review of Private Hospital Decisions
a. Majority rule: private hospital decisions are not subject to judicial
review
A majority of jurisdictions do not subject private hospital decisions to
judicial review. 46 Because a private hospital is not a government entity it
cannot engage in state action, thus it is generally not bound by the consti-
tutional due process requirements of the fifth or fourteenth amendments.
47
39. D. SUBER, supra note 36, at 3.
40. See supra note 5.
41. See Hollowell, Decisions About Hospital Staff Privileges: A Case for Judicial Deference,
11 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 118, 118 (1983) (public hospitals must comply with due process
while private hospitals are generally immune).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 120 (minimal due process requires an opportunity to be heard by the decision-
making body and a fair and unbiased decisionmaking tribunal).
45. Id. at 119-20.
46. See Nodzenski, supra note 26, at 953 (majority of jurisdictions do not review private
staffing decisions); Southwick, Hospital Medical Staff Privileges, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 655,
664-69 (1969) (private hospitals have discretion in staffing).
47. See Hollowell, supra note 41, at 118.
1990]
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This viewpoint is shared by the vast majority of jurisdictions. 48 However, a
minority view subjects private staffing decisions to judicial review based on
a fiduciary theory.4 9
b. Minority view: private hospitals may be liable on a fiduciary theory
The minority view was first articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital.° In that case, an osteopathic physician
filed an application for staff privileges at Newcomb Hospital, a private
institution. The hospital refused to review the application because hospital
bylaws required an applicant to be a graduate of a school approved by the
American Medical Association and to be a member of the County Medical
Society." The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the plaintiff physician
had a right to have his application evaluated on its own merits despite the
bylaw requirement. 2 The court based its reasoning on the fiduciary rela-
tionship between the public and a private hospital. The court noted that
hospitals operate for the "benefit of the public, and that their existence is
for the purpose of faithfully furnishing facilities to the members of the
48. See Note, Michigan Court Joins Majority in Denying Judicial Review of Staffing
Decisions of Private Hospitals, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 339, 340 (1982) (breakdown of juris-
dictions following the majority and minority approaches of judicial review of private hospitals).
For examples of case law holding private staffing decisions not subject to judicial review, see
Natale v. Sisters of Mercy of Council Bluffs, 243 Iowa 582, 596-97, 52 N.W.2d 701, 709 (1952)
(private hospital may exclude a physician from hospital staff); Clark v. Physicians & Surgeons
Hosp. Inc., 121 So. 2d 752, 754 (La. Ct. App. 1960) (private hospital had right to exclude
physicians from staff); Ponca City Hosp., Inc. v. Murphree, 545 P.2d 738, 742 (Okla. 1976)
(absent showing of causal relationship between the state's activity and activity causing injury
or claim of discrimination because of race, sex or age, court will not review hospital staffing
decision where building of privately owned hospital financed with federal funds); Hagan v.
Osteopathic Gen. Hosp., 102 R.I. 717, 726-27, 232 A.2d 596, 602 (1967) (osteopathic physician
not denied equal protection or due process when refused staff privileges); Nashville Memorial
Hosp., Inc., v. Binkley, 534 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. 1976) (receipt of federal funds does not
deprive private hospital of authority in staffing decisions).
49. See Woodard v. Porter Hosp. Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37 (1966) (equitable relief
available to physician who was unreasonably, arbitrarily, or discriminately excluded from
hospital staff). See also Reiswig v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Medical Center, 130 Ariz. 164, 168,
634 P.2d 976, 980 (1981) (hospital regulation requiring a 48-month residency before a physician
may enter a training program subject to judicial review of question whether regulation was
arbitrary and capricious interference with ability to pursue occupation).
The duties of a private hospital are regulated by its bylaws, constitution, and charter.
Woodard, 125 Vt. at 122, 217 A.2d at 39. Private hospitals have a broad range of discretion
in determining their policies. Id. at 123, 217 A.2d at 40. Consequently, those policies will not
be subject to judicial review unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory. Id. The
court's power to intervene is derived from its fiduciary powers to benefit the public good. Id.
50. 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
51. Id. at 392, 192 A.2d at 819.
52. Id. at 401, 192 A.2d at 824.
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medical profession in aid of their service to the public." 53 The court also
acknowledged that the hospital received a large part of its funds from public
sources and, due to its isolated location, had monopoly power . 4
The Greisman view remains in the minority, however. Another example
of limited judicial review in the peer review setting has recently been vacated.
In Bolt v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center,55 a physician received judicial
review of his rejection from three hospitals in Florida. Florida courts construe
hospital bylaws as a contract between the physician and the hospital,5 6 thus
a physician has a cause of action for injunctive relief if a hospital revokes
his privileges in violation of hospital bylaws.17 In such a case, typically the
courts review staff privilege decisions to determine if termination was based
on fair procedures, valid criteria, and sufficient evidence. 8 The courts do
not, however, review the merits.5 9 Such limited judicial review of peer review
decisions is a middle ground between active judicial review and none at all.
Not all jurisdictions fall clearly in one category or the other. Some have
yet to take a stand. The next section will review judicial review of private
hospital decisions in Oregon, where the cause of action in Patrick v. Burget
arose.
c. Judicial review in Oregon
Oregon courts have failed to decide whether to subject private hospital
decisions to judicial review. The next two cases demonstrate this reluctance.
1. Huffaker v. Bailey.60-In Huffaker, a physician was denied initial staff
privileges by a private hospital because of an incomplete application. The
application failed to document that the physician could work well with others.
The Oregon Supreme Court advocated judicial restraint, and therefore did
not decide whether private hospitals were subject to judicial review. Instead,
the court merely assumed for the circumstances of this case that the decisions
would be so subject.6 ' Specifically, the court held that the plaintiff would not
53. Id. at 403-04, 192 A.2d at 825. The court explained that hospital officials are vested
with managing discretion to elevate hospital and medical care standards. Id. If a decision to
deny staff privileges is unrelated to sound hospital standards or not in furtherance of the
common good, the court would be remiss if it did not intervene. Id.
54. Id. at 396, 192 A.2d at 821. The monopoly was explained as follows. The hospital was
the only hospital in the area. Id. at 398, 192 A.2d at 824. Because all doctors need hospital
facilities, all area doctors wanted to be on staff at Newcomb and all area patients sought
needed treatment at Newcomb. Id. Consequently, the hospital's discretion in choosing medical
personnel was tied to questions of public good. Id.
55. 851 F.2d 1273 (11th Cir. 1988), vacated, 874 F.2d 755 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
56. Bolt, 851 F.2d 1273, 1283 (1988).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1283.
59. Bolt, 874 F.2d 755 (1989).
60. 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398 (1975).
61. Id. at 275, 540 P.2d at 1399. The court stated, "[in view of our conclusion that
petitioner cannot prevail even assuming the case is properly before us, we find it unnecessary
to decide these interesting questions. . . . Therefore, we assume, but do not decide, that the
hospital's decisions are subject to review by mandamus." Id.
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prevail on the merits even if properly before the court and stated that it was
unnecessary to decide the issue of judicial review.62 According to the Court,
"[a]s long as the denial was made in good faith and supported by an adequate
factual basis, we are not disposed to invalidate it.' 63
2. Straube v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd.64-In Straube, the court,
like the Huffaker court, declined to decide the judicial review issue. In
Straube, a radiologist brought suit against a private hospital for wrongful
suspension of his staff privileges. 65 The Supreme Court of Oregon held that
the inability to work with others insofar as it jeopardizes patient care is a
good reason to terminate staff privileges. 66 In addressing the issue of the
availability of judicial review, the Oregon Supreme Court stated, "[tihis
court has never decided whether there is such a duty in Oregon, and it is
unnecessary to do so in this case." ' 67 Thus far, no court in Oregon as decided
whether judicial review is available for plaintiffs who wish the merits of
their cause considered.
3. Immunity Statutes
Physicians whose staff privileges have been revoked or denied through the
actions of a peer review committee have sued individual committee mem-
bers. 6s All fifty states 69 and Congress 0 have enacted legislation that provides
62. Id.
63. Id. at 280-81, 540 P.2d at 1401.
64. 287 Or. 375, 600 P.2d 381 (1979).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 384, 600 P.2d at 387.
67. Id. at 380, 600 P.2d at 384.
68. See D. SUBER, supra note 36, at 3.
69. See ALA. CODE § 34-24-58 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 18.23.020 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 36-445.01-02 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-9-502 (1987); CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.7 (West
1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.5-101 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-19a (West 1987);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1768 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.40 (West 1986); GA. CODE
ANN. § 88-3202 (Harrison 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.7 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-1392c
(1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4400-5 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-3 (Burns
1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.135 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-442 (1985); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.377 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983 & Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44.7 (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3293 (1988 & Supp. 1988-1989); MD.
HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-603 (1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85N (West 1985
& Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 331.531 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.63
(West Supp. 1988-89); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-63-5 (1972 & Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
537.035 (Vernon 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-201 (1987); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-147.01
(1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.364 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-8-c (1983); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A-22.10 (West Supp. 1988-89); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-9-4 (1986); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 6527 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (1988); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 23-01-02.1 (1978 & Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.25 (Anderson 1981 &
Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, §§ 24-28 (West Supp. 1988-89); OR. REV. STAT. §
41.675 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.3 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-
7 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-10 (Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-4-
25 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-219 (1986 & Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
[Vol. 39:881
PATRICK v. BURGET
immunity for physicians serving on peer review committees. 7' Immunity
statutes for peer review activities vary in content and in the scope of
protection that is offered. In addition to state immunity statutes, the recently
enacted Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 provides a degree of
immunity for peer review participants. 72
a. State immunity statutes
Generally, most state immunity statutes provide legal immunity for peer
review committee members who act in good faith and without malice in
conducting their investigations. 73 Some statutes offer immunity to nonphy-
sician members of a peer review committee. For example, the Illinois im-
munity statute provides immunity to any person serving on the committee
or providing service to the committee. 74 To qualify for immunity, most
statutes require that a member act in good faith, without malice, or with
reasonableness. 7 The Illinois statute protects all peer review activities which
do not involve willful and wanton misconduct. 76
b. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 198671 ("Act") is the
applicable federal immunity statute. The Act has two features. First, it grants
immunity to physicians serving on peer review committees as long as they
conform to the requirements of the Act.7 1 Second, the Act requires the
4495B, § 5.06 (Vernon Supp. 1988-1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-25 (1986 & Supp. 1988);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1441 (Supp. 1988-1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.16 (1984 & Supp.
1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.240 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-2 (1986); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 146.37 (West Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 35-2-603 (1988).
70. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11151 (Supp. V 1987).
71. See D. SUBER, supra note 36, at 7.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (Supp. V 1987).
73. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4400-5 (1987) ("any person serving on such
committee ... shall not be liable for civil damages as a result of their acts, omissions, decisions,
or any other conduct in connection with their duties on such committees, except those involving
wilful or wanton misconduct").
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.7(b) (1989) ("There shall be no civil liability for
any member of a peer review committee ... provided that ... [tihe member ... acted without
malice; and . . . the member was authorized to perform in the manner in which the member
did."). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-7(f) (1987) ("no member of a medical peer review
committee ... shall be criminally or civilly liable for the performance of any duty ... provided
that such action is without malice and is based upon a reasonable belief that the action is
warranted").
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4400-5 (1987).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (Supp. V 1987).
78. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 states that Congress finds the
following:
(1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need to improve the
quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that warrant greater
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reporting of any information on malpractice payments or disciplinary actions
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services or to any entity designated
by the Secretary.7 9
Congress enacted the Act to address the increasing occurrences of mal-
practice and to improve the quality of medical care nationwide. 0 In addition,
it intended to restrict the movement of incompetent physicians from state
to state. s ' To this end, Congress hoped to remedy these problems through
effective peer review.8 2 By providing immunity for good faith peer review
actions, Congress intended to encourage professional participation in such
committees.83
D. Antitrust Issues in Peer Review
In addition to suing individual committee members, physicians have chal-
lenged peer review decisions by filing antitrust actions against review com-
efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual state.
(2) There is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move
from State to State without disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous
damaging or incompetent performance.
(3) This nationwide problem can be remedied through effective professional peer
review.
(4) The threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws, including
treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages phy-
sicians from participating in effective professional peer review.
(5) There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for
physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.
42 U.S.C. § 11101 (Supp. V 1987).
Immunity for peer review committee members will attach only if there is compliance with
the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1112 (Supp. V 1987). Section 11l12(a) provides that for purposes
of the protection set forth in section I I 111(a) of title 42, a professional review action must be
taken:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health
care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician
involved or after such other procedures are as fair to the physician under the
circumstances, and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after
such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after meeting the requirements of
paragraph (3). A professional review action shall be presumed to have met the
preceding standards necessary or the protection set out in section 11111(a) of this
title unless the presumption is rebutted by a pre-ponderance of the evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 11112 (Supp. V 1987). See also George, The Health Care Quality Improvement
Act of 1986, 84 N.J. MED. 401 (June 1987); Iglehart, Congress Moves to Bolster Peer Review:
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 960 (Apr. 9, 1987);
Note, Physician Staff Privilege Cases: Antitrust Liability and the Health Care Quality Improve-
ment Act, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609 (1988).
79. See George, supra note 78, at 401.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
81. Id. §.1l101(a)(2).
82. Id. § 11101(a)(3).
83. Id. § lll01(a)(4).
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mittees and hospitals. 84 Generally, plaintiffs file these actions under section
1 of the Sherman Act. 5 The federal antitrust statute prohibits contracts and
84. E.g., Tambone v. Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County, Inc., 825 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.
1987) (peer review committee not immune from antitrust liability under state action doctrine);
Sarin v. Samaritan Health Center, 813 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1987), later proceeding, 176 Mich.
App. 790, 440 N.W.2d 80 (physician could not prevail under antitrust law for failure to show
de minimis effect on interstate commerce); Goss v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 789 F.2d 353 (5th
Cir. 1986) (per se rule not applied to alleged boycott of physician by two hospitals); Cooper
v. Forsyth County Hosp. Authority, Inc., 789 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1986) (podiatrists unsuccessful
in claim of anticompetitive conspiracy against hospital), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986); Doe
v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Fort Wayne, 788 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1986) (physician failed to state
claim under antitrust laws); Smith v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, P.C., 779 F.2d 1173 (6th
Cir. 1985) (physicians failed to establish a prima facie case of monopolization); Marrese v.
Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984) (hospital and peer review committee exempt from
antitrust liability under the state action doctrine), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); Weiss v.
York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984) (class action against hospital for denial of staff
privileges of osteopaths), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985); Crane v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981) (rehearing en banc) (pathologist victorious in antitrust
claim against hospital on price fixing and limitation of competition); Quinn v. Kent General
Hosp., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1367 (D. Del. 1987) (residency requirement for staff physicians had
substantial effect on interstate commerce); Vuciecevic v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 572 F.
Supp. 1424 (N.D. I11. 1983) (physician unsuccessful in antitrust claim under either per se rule
or rule of reason); Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (pediatric
cardiothoracic surgeon brought antitrust action for revocation of staff privileges).
The use of the antitrust laws to challenge unfavorable results and obtain judicial review of
peer review decisions has increased dramatically. "This trend is based on the destruction of
traditional barriers to antitrust suits against health care providers, changes in the character of
the health care market, and the limited success physicians have achieved in obtaining judicial
review of staff privilege decisions." Trail & Kelley-Claybrook, supra note 26, at 354. The fact
that the Supreme Court has held such decisions subject to the antitrust laws is consistent with
the significant increase in competition that has been caused by the changes in the health care
industry. Id. These authors discuss the number of changes that the health care industry has
witnessed in the last several decades, including reconstruction of the cost reimbursement system,
growth of private, for-profit hospitals, and proliferation of HMOs. Id. at 353-54.
85. See Trail & Kelly-Claybrook, supra note 26, at 359. See, e.g., Tambone v. Memorial
Hosp. for McHenry County, Inc., 825 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiffs challenging peer review decisions may also join their section 1 claim with a
monopolization claim under section 2.
The test for determining whether a defendant has monopolized in violation of
section 2 has been articulated as: '(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.'
Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 825 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985)
(quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). Definition of the relevant
product and geographic markets, proof of defendant's monopoly power, and proof of its willful
acquisition are all part of the section 2 analysis. See id. at 825-28. Perhaps because of the more
complex analysis for monopolization claims, plaintiffs' section 2 claims often fail where their
section 1 claims succeed. Id. at 817-29. For other examples of cases where section 2 claims
have failed, see Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (nurse anesthetist
did not prevail in claim against hospital in absence of evidence of market for anesthesia services
or defendant hospital's power in that market); Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp. Authority,
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conspiracies which restrain trade and reduce competition. 6 The Supreme
Court has long noted, however, that every commercial agreement, like a
peer review decision, restrains tradea 7 Thus, only those agreements which
unreasonably restrain trade are held to violate section 1 of the Sherman
Act.a
Initially, a plaintiff who attempts to bring an antitrust action under the
Sherman Act must satisfy a jurisdictional requirement. That is, the plaintiff
must show some connection between denial of privileges and interstate
commerce. 9 To fulfill the jurisdictional requirements under sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must allege and prove a substantial effect
on interstate commerce ° There is a split in the circuits as to exactly what
Inc., 789 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1986) (podiatrists denied privileges failed to offer sufficient evidence
of existence of a conspiracy to monopolize the foot care market), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972
(1986); Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hosp. Medical Center, 733 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir.)
(anesthesiologist's claim that hospital and corporation attempted and conspired to monopolize
anesthesia services rejected), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984); Pontius v. Children's Hosp.,
552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (pediatric surgeon's claim rejected where he failed to show
any intent on part of hospital or staff to monopolize); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp.
842 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (surgeon's claim rejected where evidence did not support allegations that
defendant hospital's denial of staff privileges constituted monopolization, attempted monopo-
lization, or conspiracy to monopolize open-heart surgery market), affd, 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
For additional resources on antitrust challenges to staff privilege decisions based on peer
review, see Dolan & Ralston, Hospital Admitting Privileges and the Sherman Act, 18 Hous.
L. REV. 707 (1981); Drexel, The Antitrust Implications of the Denial of Staff Privileges, 36 U.
MiAMI L. REV. 207 (1982); Halper, The Health Care Industry and the Antitrust Law: Collision
Course?, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 17 (1980); Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and
Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdoms, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1982); Miles &
Philp, supra note 17, at 489; Note, The Denial of Open Staff Hospital Privileges: An Antitrust
Scrutiny, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 751 (1982).
86. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
87. Northwest Wholesaler Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 289 (1985) ("[Elvery commercial agreement restrains trade."); Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation
of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.").
88. Northwest, 472 U.S. at 289 ("Whether this action violates section 1 of the Sherman
Act depends on whether it is adjudged an unreasonable restraint.") (emphasis in original).
"The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition." Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
89. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act prohibit restraints of trade and monopolizing
behavior that affect "trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations."
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982). See Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 85, at 614.
90. Miles & Philp, supra note 17, at 505-06. The authors explain the jurisdictional require-
ment as follows. The plaintiff in any antitrust case brought under sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act must allege and prove a substantial effect on interstate commerce. There is a split
in the circuits regarding whether the plaintiff must show that the alleged restraint affects
commerce, or whether a showing that the general business activities of the defendant affect
interstate commerce is sufficient. Id. at 505 (emphasis in original).
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a plaintiff must allege. Some courts have held that a physician must allege
an effect on interstate commerce resulting from the defendant's general
business activities. 91 Other courts have held that a physician must allege an
effect on interstate commerce resulting from the hospital's alleged illegal
activity. 92
After the claim passes the jurisdictional test, the federal courts9" have
developed two modes of analyzing the reasonableness of a particular agree-
ment. These approaches are: (1) the per se analysis; and, (2) the Rule of
Reason analysis.
1. Per se analysis
The per se analysis is used only in cases where the challenged business
activity is the type which has "proved to be predominantly anticompeti-
tive. ' ' 94 Several classes of behavior constitute per se violations. One example
of a per se violation is a concerted refusal to deal or a group boycott. 9
Other examples of per se violations are price-fixing agreements and territorial
restrictions. 96 Although the per se rule may be easier than the Rule of Reason
analysis for courts to apply, 97 the Supreme Court has cautioned against
91. E.g., Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 824
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
92. E.g., Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 417 (7th Cir. 1986).
93. "[Flederal antitrust claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts."
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 375 (1985). But see
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 1984)
(en banc) (dictum) ("[I]t is hard to understand why state courts should be thought less competent
to enforce the federal antitrust laws than the federal civil rights laws-which they have
jurisdiction concurrently with the federal courts to enforce-particularly when they can adju-
dicate federal antitrust defenses with preclusive effect."), rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
94. Northwest Wholesaler Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary 7 Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 289 (1985). "The decision to apply the per se rule turns on 'whether the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
output ....... Id. at 289-90 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)).
95. See Northwest, 472 U.S. at 290. Such activity is "so likely to restrict competition without
any offsetting efficiency gains that they should be condemned as per se violations of (section)
I of the Sherman Act." Id. Another example of a per se violation is an agreement to fix prices.
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982); Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (price-fixing held a section 1 violation),
aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
96. E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal restraints, defined
as an "agreement between competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate
territories in order to minimize competition," are per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman
Act); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (setting forth the per
se rule against price fixing agreements as "a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate
or foreign commerce is illegal per se").
97. Under the per se rule, agreements which fall into certain categories, such as price-fixing
agreements, are per se unreasonable and are struck without consideration of purpose, power
or effect. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 n.59 (1940).
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overzealous use of the per se analysis. 9 Thus, courts have generally rejected
application of a per se analysis to staff privilege decisions. 99 Instead, courts
apply the Rule of Reason analysis to such cases.
2. Rule of Reason analysis
Under the Rule of Reason analysis, "the factfinder weighs all of the
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition."'1° The
considerations relevant to the reasonableness of a staff privilege decision
may include the legitimacy of evaluation criteria, notice of such criteria to
the plaintiff, and the decision's consistency with other staff privilege deci-
sions.' 0 Because a restrictive practice may have both anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects, a court will find an antitrust violation only if the
anticompetitive effects predominate. 0 2
It has been noted that antitrust challenges to staff privilege decisions
usually arise in three scenarios. 03 First, a dissatisfied physician may allege
that the denial of privileges resulted from a conspiracy between the creden-
tialing committee and the governing body.' °4 Second, a dissatisfied physician
98. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-
20 (1979) (per se treatment justified only where purpose and effect of challenged practice are
to threaten free market economy); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08
(1972) ("It is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts
classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act.").
99. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-29 (1984); Goss v.
Memorial Hosp. System, 789 F.2d 353, 354-56 (5th Cir. 1986); Vuciecevic v. MacNeal Memorial
Hosp., 572 F. Supp. 1424, 1427-29 (N.D. 111. 1983); Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp.
1352, 1367-70 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp 842, 919-25 (W.D. Pa.
1981). But see Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 818-22 (applying per se analysis but noting
the discriminatory application of standards and lack of explanation for excluding osteopaths
as a group). See also Trail & Kelly-Claybrook, supra note 26, at 357-58 (unless defendant's
anticompetitive purpose is demonstrated, per se standard will not be applied to staff privilege
decisions).
100. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (footnote omitted).
101. See Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 919-25 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d
824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
102. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-89 (1978). See
also Robinson, 521 F. Supp. at 919 (hospital staff selection policy not unreasonable because
favorable competitive effects of policy outweigh anticompetitive effects).
103. See Enders, supra note 4, at 332; See also Miles & Philp, supra note 17, at 498. These
authors state that antitrust problems usually arise from the following factual contexts:
1) Denial of a physician's initial application for medical staff membership or clinical
privileges; 2) Denial of privileges to allied health professionals such as nurse
midwives, nurse anesthetists, podiatrists, and chiropractors; 3) Nonrenewal of a
practitioner's clinical privileges; 4) Denial of some clinical privileges while granting
of others; 5) Suspension, reduction, or termination of privileges; and 6) An exclusive
contract between the hospital and a single physician (or single group of physicians)
to provide the medical services in question at the hospital.
Id. at 498-99.
104. Enders, supra note 4, at 332.
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may allege that the hospital medical staff conspired to exclude him from the
staff.105 Finally, when an exclusive arrangement or contract exists between
the hospital and a group of specialists, a dissatisfied physician may allege
an unlawful arrangement. °6
E. Possible Defenses to Antitrust Challenges
1. The Supreme Court rejected two rationales
The Supreme Court has rejected two rationales which litigants and com-
mentators have suggested might shield the health care industry from antitrust
claims. One proposed rationale for immunity from the antitrust laws is that
there should be a "learned professions" exemption for the health industry
on the basis that it is noncommercial, or rather, not a "trade or commerce"
encompassed by the antitrust laws. 07 However, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,'0 the Court rejected a learned professions exemption when it held that
"[t]he nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary
from the Sherman Act."' 1 9 Although Goldfarb involved the legal profession,
subsequent Supreme Court cases have made it clear that there is no learned
professions exemption, at least at the federal level, that shields anticompe-
titive practices in the medical profession."10
105. Id.
106. Id. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
107. Kissam, Webber, Bigus, & Holzgraefe, supra note 85, at 614-15.
108. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
109. Id. at 787. In Goldfarb, petitioners could not locate an attorney who would examine
the title to a house they were purchasing for less than the amount listed in the minimum fee
schedule published by the Fairfax County Bar Association and enforced by the Virginia State
Bar. Petitioners filed an antitrust suit claiming that the minimum fee schedule violated section
1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 776-78.
One of the arguments made by the County Bar against the application of the antitrust laws
was that Congress never intended to include the learned professions within the scope of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 786. The Court stressed that it could not "find support for the proposition
that Congress intended any such sweeping exclusion." Id. at 787. Although the Court acknowl-
edged that professions are different from trades and other businesses, the Court found that the
practice of law has a sufficient "business aspect" to be encompassed within the antitrust laws.
Id. at 787-88. See generally Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 85, at 614. The
Court rejected such a "sweeping" exemption for three reasons: (1) the absence of any statutory
language or legislative history to support such an exemption; (2) the "heavy presumption"
against implicit or judicially recognized exemptions from federal antitrust law; and (3) the
"business" or "commercial" aspect of exchanging professional services for money. Id.
110. E.g., National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978)
(professional engineers may not establish an ethical canon which prohibits competitive bidding,
and Goldfarb should not be read as fashioning a broad exemption under the Rule of Reason
for learned professions) (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-89 n.17
(1975)). See generally Trail & Kelley-Claybrook, supra note 26, at 362 (collecting cases); Kissam,
Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 85, at 614-16 (gives analysis of case law and concludes
that "[ilt is unlikely ...that federal courts will recognize an antitrust exemption that covers
privilege decisions" on the basis of a learned profession or noncommercial exemption).
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A second argument for immunizing medical peer review decisions from
the antitrust laws is that the activity is inherently local and is outside the
realm of the antitrust laws."' Therefore, it does not affect interstate com-
merce. However, this possible exemption, based on the jurisdictional re-
quirements of the Sherman Act, was also rejected by the Supreme Court."'
In Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 3 petitioner brought
an antitrust action under both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, alleging
that respondents acted in concert to block the relocation and expansion of
petitioner's hospital, and that intentional delay tactics were for the purpose
of monopolizing "the business of providing compensated medical and sur-
gical services" in the area." 4 The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate
court's conclusion that interstate commerce was not affected.", "[The fact
that an effect on interstate commerce might be termed 'indirect' because the
conduct producing it is not 'purposely directed' toward interstate commerce
does not lead to a conclusion that the conduct at issue is outside the scope
of the Sherman Act. '"" 6 The Court's holding merely stated that conduct
may affect interstate commerce and thus satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
of the Sherman Act even if it was not "purposely directed" toward interstate
commerce. 17 In other words, an indirect effect on interstate commerce may
be sufficient." 8 It follows that if the action was not purposefully directed at
interstate commerce and in addition did not have even an indirect effect on
interstate commerce, the jurisdictional defense may still be valid. Defendants
continue to raise this defense." 9
Clearly, the peer review process utilized by hospitals in making staff
privilege decisions often implicates the antitrust laws. 20 In light of the Court's
rejection of learned professions or noncommercial grounds for exemption,
defendants have turned to the state action doctrine as a possible defense.
Because of the increasing importance of the state action doctrine in these
cases, the next section will describe the basic aspects of this doctrine.
11l. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides: "Every contract, combination in form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states,
or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal .... 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1980). See also Trail &
Kelley-Claybrook, supra note 26, at 351-52 (observing Supreme Court's rejection of exempting
health care industry from antitrust protection).
112. See Trail & Kelley-Claybrook, supra note 26, at 351-52.
113. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
114. Id. at 740-41.
115. Id. at 743-44.
116. Id. at 744.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Proger, Antitrust Developments Affecting the Health Care Sector, 57 ANTITRUST
L.J. 315 (1988).
120. See supra notes 84-106 and accompanying text.
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2. The state action doctrine
The Supreme Court first articulated the state action doctrine in Parker v.
Brown.121 In Parker, a California raisin producer filed a suit challenging the
state's Agricultural Prorate Act, which established a marketing plan for the
1940 raisin crop, as violative of the Sherman Act. 122 The Court stressed that
although the same conduct by private parties would clearly violate the
Sherman Act, 123 since the action was authorized by the state, 24 the Court
must consider whether Congress meant to include the states within the
purview of the Sherman Act.' 2' After an examination of the statute and its
legislative history, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to
include the states when it passed the Sherman Act. 26
The Parker doctrine, therefore, is an implied exemption which allows
states to engage in anticompetitive conduct without restraint from the anti-
trust laws. 127 Essentially, this exemption has its basis in principles of feder-
alism and a recognition of state sovereignty, in that the Court requires
specific Congressional action before the states' authority to regulate within
121. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Although Parker is credited with establishing the state action
doctrine, one commentator has noted the roots of the doctrine prior to Parker. See Lopatka,
The State of "State Action" Antitrust Immunity: A Progress Report, 46 LA. L. REV. 941, 947-
48 n.17 (1986).
122. Parker, 317 U.S. at 344-47. The marketing plan of the Agricultural Prorate Act regulated
the pricing and distribution of the raisin crop. The purpose of the Act was "to prevent economic
waste" and to "conserve the agricultural wealth of the state." Id. at 346.
123. Id. at 350.
124. The program "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of
the state and was not intended to operate or become effective without that command." Id. at
350.
125. Id. 'at 350-51.
126. Id. "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed
by its legislature." Id. at 350-51.
For further discussion of the state action doctrine, see Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State
Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435 (1981); Burling, Lee & Quarles, "State Action"
Antitrust Immunity-A Doctrine in Search of a Definition, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 809; Easter-
brook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & EcON. 23 (1983); Morgan,
Antitrust and State Regulation: Standards of Immunity After Midcal, 35 ARK. L. REV. 453
(1981); Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique
of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U.L. REV. 1099 (1981); Posner,
The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 693 (1974); Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713
(1986).
127. See Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 85, at 619. As one commentator
points out, "[ilt is clear that the Court found an implied exemption from the antitrust laws
for actions undertaken by state representatives that can be attributed to the state. Because
federal law contains no express exemption from the antitrust laws for state action, any exemption
had to be implied." Lopatka, supra note 121, at 951.
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their own borders can be curtailed. 2 ' After Parker, however, the Court did
not address the doctrine again until 1975, when it decided Goldfarb.2 9
Between 1975 and 1985, the Court issued a multitude of opinions that
attempted to further develop and define the doctrine and its reaches. 30
a. The Midcal test
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 31 the Supreme Court articulated a two-pronged test to determine when
128. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51: "In a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from
their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents
is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." Id. at 351. See also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38 (1985) ("In Parker, relying on principles of federalism and state
sovereignty, the Court refused to construe the Sherman Act as applying to the anticompetitive
conduct of a State acting through its legislature."); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference,
Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 61 (1985) ("The Parker doctrine represents an attempt to
resolve conflicts that may arise between principles of federalism and the goal of the antitrust
laws, unfettered competition in the marketplace."); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567
(1984) (the basis of Parker were "principles of federalism and state sovereignty"); City of
Lafayette v. Louisana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978) (stressing that cities do
not receive the same deference as states which is required by federalism); Malina, Supreme
Court Update: State Action Doctrine, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 289, 300 (1985) ("The concept was
grounded on the fundamentals of our federal system and reflected an historically sound and
pragmatic view of the proper scope of state economic regulation which . . . the Congress that
enacted the Sherman Act did not intend to disturb."); Recent Developments, Antitrust Act-
State Action Immunity-Bar Examiners' Liability: Hoover v. Ronwin, 52 TENN. L. REV. 525,
528-30 (1985) (discussion of Parker premises and background of law).
129. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
130. As one commentator noted:
[B]eginning with Goldfarb in 1975, no other antitrust topic has so captured the
Court's attention. Virtually every year brought a new opinion adding a new inter-
pretation-or at least a new gloss-on the doctrine announced with what appeared
to be characteristic clarity by Chief Justice Stone in Parker v. Brown in 1943.
Malina, supra note 128, at 299.
Key Supreme Court decisions on the state action doctrine after Parker and Goldfarb include:
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1985)
(private party can claim immunity under state action doctrine when conduct is state supervised
and pursuant to clearly articulated state policy); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471
U.S. 34, 38-39 (1985) (extended state action immunity to municipalities where state authorized
action); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 570-73 (1984) (broadened immunity given to state
legislatures and supreme courts to include state officials and agencies when there is nominal
supervision or guidelines set forth); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum
Co., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (Court enunciates for the first time a two part test to determine
whether state action doctrine is applicable); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439
U.S. 96, 109 (1978) (Court upheld a California statute which allowed private restraint of trade
since the legislature established "a system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed"); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977) (the "affirmative
command of the Arizona Supreme Court" prohibiting attorney advertising was sufficient as a
clear articulation of the state's policy); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 594-96
(1976) (anticompetitive conduct by private parties must be compelled by the state in order to
be protected by the state action doctrine).
131. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). In Midcal, state wine producers and wholesalers were required by
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the state action doctrine would protect anticompetitive conduct. "First, the
challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by
the State itself."'3 Although neatly articulated, the Midcal test nevertheless
created confusion because it left several important questions unanswered.'
These questions included the extent of protection given to state officials and
state actors other than the state legislature or state supreme court, the degree
to which municipalities could claim protection, and whether compulsion was
necessary to protect private parties acting under a state's authority.
The companion cases of Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire'14 and
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States3 1 cleared
up many of the ambiguities left after Midcal by delineating the standards to
be applied in several contexts.1 6 Although the Court has emphasized that
"[t]he success of an antitrust action should depend upon the nature of the
activity challenged, rather than on the identity of the defendant,"'1 7 its
current approach focuses on the parties. Specifically, unless an action is
clearly that of the legislature or state supreme court, Midcal is applied to
varying degrees depending on the identity of the defendant: a state official
or agency, a municipality, or regulated private parties.
1. State supreme court, legislature and municipalities. -When the chal-
lenged conduct is that of the state supreme court or legislature, the Supreme
Court has stated, in Hoover v. Ronwin, that Midcal need not be applied at
a California state statute to file fair trade contracts or price schedules in order to sell wine.
No wine merchant was allowed to sell wine at any other price than one set by a fair trade
contract or effective price schedule. Id. at 99. A wholesaler filed an antitrust challenge after
having been fined for violation of the statute, seeking an injunction against the wine-selling
scheme. Id. at 100.
132. Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
410 (1978)). In applying the Midcal test to the wine pricing system established by the California
statute, the Court held that the first prong was satisfied. The state had a clearly articulated
policy: "California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale price maintenance." Id.
at 103. However, the pricing scheme failed to satisfy the second prong of active supervision,
since the private wine producers, rather than the state, set the prices. Id. at 105. No substantial
State involvement afforded California Liquor Dealers Association immunity under the state
action doctrine. The Court stressed that "[tihe State simply authorizes price setting and enforces
the prices established by private parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts."
Id. at 105-06.
133. See generally Lopatka, supra note 121, at 995 ("[w]here the Court went wrong in Midcal
was to confuse the ultimate fact at issue in state action immunity cases with subsidiary facts
tending to prove the ultimate fact"); Malina, supra note 128, at 299 (Midcal left several
questions on the applicability of the doctrine unanswered).
134. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
135. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
136. Malina, supra note 128, at 299-301.
137. Southern Motor, 471 U.S. at 58-59.
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all; indeed, such is purely state action that is protected under the doctrine.'
The extent of protection afforded state officials and agencies is less clear.
However, commentators argue that when acts are pursuant to clearly artic-
ulated policy, Midcal should apply only if there is nominal supervision.13 9
As to the degree of protection afforded municipalities, under Hallie only the
first prong of Midcal need be satisfied. 40 The Court rejected the need for
compulsion by the state to immunize the municipality's action,' 4' as well as
a need for active supervision, 42 and held that the doctrine applied to the
action if it was "pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy.' 43
138. 466 U.S. 558, 569 (1984) ("Where the conduct at issue is in fact that of the state
legislature or supreme court, we need not address the issues of 'clear articulation' and 'active
supervision.' ").
139. Lopatka, supra note 121, at 1038:
The "state," for purposes of state action, includes at least the legislature and the
state supreme court when acting in a legislative capacity. It should and probably
does include the governor and the supreme court acting in any constitutionally
appropriate capacity. It also includes some state agencies, but the analysis for
determining which agencies constitute the state is uncertain. The best interpretation
of Supreme Court precedent is that only legitimate state agencies acting within the
scope of their authority represent the state.
Id. In Hoover, the Court indicated that "the anticompetitive conduct of a nonsovereign state
representative" is encompassed by the state action doctrine when the conduct is pursuant to a
clearly articulated state policy, yet "the degree to which the state legislature or supreme court
supervises its representative is relevant to the inquiry." 466 U.S. 558, 569 (1984).
The Hoover decision is credited with expanding the automatic immunity accorded to state
legislatures and supreme courts to include subordinates in certain circumstances. See Recent
Developments, State Action Immunity, supra note 128, at 545.
140. 471 U.S. at 45-46. The Court had previously made it clear that municipalities were not
afforded the same deference as states and therefore their actions were not automatically shielded
from the antitrust laws. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412
(1978). "In light of the serious economic dislocation which could result if cities were free to
place their own parochial interests above the Nation's economic goals reflected in the antitrust
laws ...we are especially unwilling to presume that Congress intended to exclude anticom-
petitive municipal action from their [sic] reach." Id. at 412-13. Yet the Court recognized that
immunity may exist if the actions of the municipality reflect the state policy, since "[m]unicipal
corporations are instrumentalities of the State." Id. at 413 (quoting Folsom v. Mayor of New
Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287 (1883)).
In Hallie, the Court acknowledged that its previous decisions on the issue of municipality
immunity were less than clear. 471 U.S. at 40.
141. 471 U.S. at 45. The Court held that compulsion by the state was useful as an evidentiary
matter to support a municipality's assertion that it is acting pursuant to a clearly articulated
state policy. However, although useful, such compulsion was unnecessary to satisfy the first
prong of Midcal. Id. at 45-46.
142. Id. at 46. The Court emphasized that "active state supervision serves essentially an
evidentiary function: it is one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the challenged
conduct pursuant to state policy." Id. at 46. Because a municipality is an arm of the State
there is little danger of it seeking private goals. Id. at 45-47. Rather, the main danger
acknowledged by the Court is that the municipality "will seek to further purely parochial public
interests at the expense of more overriding State goals." Id. If state authorization for the action
exists, this danger is eliminated, therefore "there is no need to require the State to supervise
actively the municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated function." Id.
143. Id. at 40.
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2. Protection of private parties. -Perhaps the most significant question
left open after Midcal was the extent of protection, if any, given to private
parties under the state action doctrine, and whether or not state compulsion
was necessary for the doctrine to apply.'" However, in Southern Motor,
14
the Court made it clear that the state action doctrine could be extended to
protect private parties if both prongs of the Midcal test were satisfied.
46
Also, the Court held that the state need not have compelled the private party
to act before the state action doctrine could be invoked. 147 Rather, the Court
stated that compulsion was evidentiary in nature. Therefore, although its
existence would certainly facilitate the inquiry as to whether the private
parties were engaging in a clearly articulated state policy, compulsion was
not necessary.'
4
The Court found it necessary to extend the Parker doctrine's protection
to private parties in order to increase the options and flexibility of the state
governments in implementing regulatory programs. 49 However, because a
private party "may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own
behalf,"' 150 both prongs of the Midcal test must be satisfied.' 5' In order to
satisfy the first prong, the private party need only show that the state
sovereign (supreme court or legislature) intended to "displace competition
in a particular field with a regulatory structure," or that such was the
foreseeable result of a regulatory structure.5 2 The second prong of active
144. Malina, supra note 128, at 300-01. Earlier cases had suggested that the doctrine was
inapplicable to private parties. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 591
(1976) (in Parker, Chief Justice Stone "carefully selected language which plainly limited the
Court's holding to official action taken by state officials"); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
352 (1943) (stating, "[Tihe Sherman Act .. .must be taken to be a prohibition of individual
and not of state action").
145. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
146. Id. at 61.
147. Id. at 60-62.
148. Id. Although the Court held that compulsion was not necessary for private parties to
satisfy the first prong of Midcal, the Court stressed its value as an evidentiary tool: "Our
holding .. . does not suggest, however, that compulsion is irrelevant. To the contrary, com-
pulsion often is the best evidence that the State has a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed policy to displace competition." Id. at 61-62.
149. Id. at 56-57, 61.
150. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 (1985).
151. Southern Motor, 471 U.S. at 58-59. For an interesting comparison of distinctions between
the state, municipalities, and private parties, and how the evidentiary functions of compulsion
and supervision serve these differences in light of the Midcal test, see Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42-
46.
152. Southern Motor, 471 U.S. at 64. "A private party acting pursuant to an anticompetitive
regulatory program need not 'point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization' for its
challenged conduct." Id. (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
415 (1977)).
One commentator explains how the first prong is satisfied:
The clear state policy requirement is satisfied if the private conduct that constitutes
the restraint challenged was the foreseeable result of the state's pronouncements.
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supervision must also be met before a private party is accorded protection
under the state action doctrine.' As one commentator noted, "[active
supervision requires rather vigorous oversight, something akin to traditional
public utility regulation."1'54 Finally, in terms of the proper authority to
express policy and supervise the private parties, agencies and state officials
would probably suffice, as long as the clearly articulated policy can somehow
be traced to policy articulated by "a constitutional branch of government.""'
3. State action doctrine as peer review defense. -When peer review results
in the termination, limitation, or refusal of hospital staff privileges, the
aggrieved doctor will probably have jurisdictional grounds under the Sherman
Act to bring an antitrust challenge against the hospital as well as the doctors
who participated in the evaluating committee. 5 6 If the relevant hospital is
private,' 57 whether or not the peer review committee's decision is protected
by the state action doctrine depends on whether there exists a state statutory
scheme establishing peer review that satisfies Midcal. '" If no statutory scheme
exists, the state action doctrine may still be raised if some other form of
state supervision, such as administrative agency review or judicial review,
satisfies Midcal. 119
The state need not explicitly refer to the challenged activity or the anticompetitive
effects of that conduct. The state need not compel the activity; a permissive state
policy is adequate. Nor does immunity require that the activity be necessary to
make the regulatory act work. The best position on the issue is that private conduct
challenged as a restraint is protected if the state acted in such a way that the private
conduct was a likely consequence.
Lopatka, supra note 121, at 1038. See also P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
201.9a, at 83 (1988 Supp.) (the relevant inquiry is whether "the state really wants to displace
federal antitrust law and manifests that policy choice through an affirmative and clearly
articulated expression").
153. See Southern Motor, 471 U.S. at 62; Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10. As Areeda explains,
"[b]ecause state creation of unsupervised private power would be clearly inconsistent with the
federal antitrust laws . . . state law could not immunize private conduct without providing for
its public supervision." P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 152, 212.7, at 155.
154. Lopatka, supra note 121, at 1038-39.
155. Id.
156. At least one commentator has noted that courts dislike such challenges, and strain to
dismiss the cases early in litigation, creating "inconsistent and ambiguous analyses." Miles &
Philp, supra note 17, at 504-05. "[Alntitrust staff privilege cases . . . are expensive and time
consuming; the plaintiff wins infrequently; and the courts appear quite reluctant to second-
guess the decisions of hospitals and medical staffs with regard to staffing decisions." Id.
157. If the anticompetitive decision is made by a public hospital, Midcal probably does not
apply. See generally Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 85, at 623-25 (providing
a plausible pre-Hallie analysis to anticompetitive decisions made by public hospitals). Although
Hallie discussed the state action doctrine in respect to municipalities, public hospitals are state
actors, rather than private parties acting on behalf of the state. Therefore, arguably only the
first prong of the Midcal test would need to be satisfied. See supra notes 140-143 and
accompanying text.
158. See Patrick v. Burget, 468 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1988) (finding Oregon statutory scheme did
not satisfy the active supervision requirement of the Midcal test).
159. Id. at 103-04. In Patrick, the Court remarked in dicta that, although most prior cases
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The Seventh Circuit applied the Midcal test in Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 160
to determine whether the revocation of staff privileges was protected from
antitrust challenge under the state action doctrine.'16 Dr. Marrese, an ortho-
pedic surgeon specializing in spinal disorders, enjoyed hospital staff privileges
at Deaconess Hospital, a nonprofit corporation in Evansville, Indiana. 6 In
February of 1978, the hospital selected members of the medical staff to form
a Special Ad Hoc Committee ("SAHC") which conducted an audit of the
spinal surgeries at Deaconess. The audit revealed problems concerning
Marrese's operations. The SAHC recommended continued monitoring of
Marrese's "lumbar laminectomy and spinal fusion" cases, and eventually
retained the independent medical auditing firm of Interqual, Inc. to perform
another audit of Marrese's surgeries in 1980.163 Based upon negative findings
by Interqual, the SAHC recommended revocation of staff privileges to the
Medical Staff Executive Council, which adopted the recommendation, but
stayed enforcement pursuant to the hospital's fair hearing plan.' 64 However,
prior to the final decision of the Board of Directors, Marrese filed suit
alleging antitrust violations under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.165
In order to determine whether Deaconess' use of a peer review committee
to make staff decisions satisfied Midcal and was therefore protected by the
state action doctrine, the court made an extensive analysis of the Indiana
statutory scheme governing practitioner and hospital licensing in light of
Midcal. 66 The court held that the first prong of Midcal was satisfied,
primarily because the Indiana statutory scheme mandated the review of
hospital staff, as well as their diagnostic and surgical procedures. 167 Also,
involved administrative agency review, "state action" may also be judicial review of private
hospital decisions. Id. However, the Court declined to decide when, if ever, such judicial review
would satisfy the state action doctrine, and merely stated that in this case it did not. Id.
160. 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
161. Id. at 387-91. Although noting that the Indiana statutes clearly authorized hospitals to
establish and use peer review committees, the court stressed the necessity of determining
"whether the defendants' conduct is 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as [Indiana]
state policy' and 'actively supervised' by the State so as to be exempt from the Federal antitrust
laws under the doctrine of state action." Id. at 384.
162. Id. at 374-75. Marrese was licensed to practice in Illinois and Indiana, and was the sole
shareholder of Bone & Joint Surgeons, Inc., in Evansville, Indiana. Id. at 374.
163. Id. at 375.
164. Id. The Fair Hearing Plan essentially allows practitioners a full evidentiary hearing and
appeal. Id. at 375-76. The intricate procedure established at the hospital is pursuant to Indiana
law as set forth in IND. CODE § 34-4-12.6-2(b) requiring an opportunity for a hearing. Id. at
376.
165. Id. at 377. Marrese brought antitrust allegations against "Interqual, Inc., Deaconess
Hospital and its Board of Directors in their individual capacity, and members of the SAHC
and Executive Committee at Deaconess, including seven doctors, one hospital administrator,
and one attorney." Id. The court made clear in a footnote that at the time suit was filed, Dr.
Marrese's staff privileges had not yet been revoked. Id. at 375 n.1.
166. Id. at 387-89.
167. Id. at 388 (citing IND. CODE §§ 16-10-1-6.5 and 34-4-12.6-1 (1982)). The court emphasized
19901
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the court implied that Indiana's grant of good faith immunity to participants
of peer review committees, 68 as well as the importance of encouraging peer
review in general, 69 further demonstrated that peer review was a "clearly
articulated" policy of the state of Indiana. 70
The court next analyzed the Indiana statutes to determine whether they
set up a structure of "active supervision" as required by the second prong
of Midcal.'7' Essentially, the court found that the requisite "active supervi-
sion" was supplied by two separate statutory entities:' 72 the Indiana Medical
Licensing Board 73 and the Hospital Licensing Council. 74 The court held
that Indiana Medical Licensing Board supplied one form of supervision
because it "enacts, promulgates, and enforces" licensing rules for practi-
tioners, and it is also entitled to inspect peer review records of hospitals. 75
The Hospital Licensing Council, responsible for enacting rules and regulating
the licensing of hospitals, was another form of supervision, according to the
court, because it regularly inspected hospital records generally, including
peer review records. 76 Because the court found both prongs of Midcal
satisfied, the peer review activities of Deaconess hospital and the other
named defendants were protected under the state action doctrine. 77
The Marrese decision was followed in the Seventh Circuit7 " despite some
criticism that the court misapplied the Midcal analysis. 79 However, Marrese
that:
[Als a necessary and reasonable consequence of this state mandated medical peer
review process, hospital staff members must review the medical treatments, diag-
nostic procedures, and surgical procedures of competing staff members and, when
required, recommend the revocation of staff privileges. Thus, the defendants'
conduct ... in reviewing Dr. Marrese's surgical procedures and recommending that
his staff privileges be revoked, satisfies the first element of the Parker test.
Id. at 388-89.
168. IND. CODE §§ 16-10-1-6.5, 34-4-12.6-3 (1982).
169. Marrese, 748 F.2d at 391-92. The court stressed that "peer review is essential to the
very lifeblood and heartbeat of medical competency and quality medical care in the State of
Indiana and throughout the nation." Id. at 392.
170. Id. The court interpreted the good faith immunity provision as Indiana's acknowledge-
ment of the potential antitrust implications of peer review. Id.
171. Id. at 389-90.
172. Id. at 390.
173. IND. CODE §§ 25-22.5-2-7(h), 25-22.5-6-2.1, 34-4-12.6-2(b) (1982).
174. Id. §§ 16-10-1-1, 16-10-1-3, 16-10-1-12.
175. Marrese, 748 F.2d at 389-90. "The examination of confidential peer review data and
records is an essential element of the Board's function in regulating the medical profession and
in assuring that the citizens of Indiana receive the highest quality of medical care." Id. at 389.
176. Id. at 389-90. The court concluded that Indiana, "through the Hospital Licensing
Council, promulgates standards of proper hospital care, regulates the licensing of hospitals
within the State, and, as an integral part of its hospital inspection program, reviews the
confidential records of medical peer review committees." Id. at 390. See Miles & Philp, supra
note 17, at 507.
177. Marrese, 748 F.2d at 391.
178. See, e.g., Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ind.
1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1986).
179. See Quinn v. Kent General Hosp., 617 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Del. 1985); Miles & Philp,
supra note 17, at 506-07.
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failed to supply objective guidelines or suggest a model statutory structure
in order to provide consistency. Indeed, the court left various questions open
to interpretation. First, although Marrese implied that a statute creating
good faith immunity for peer review participants would establish "clear
articulation,"' 80 at least one court has disagreed."8 ' Also, Marrese arguably
relaxed the Midcal requirement of "active supervision" when it held that
mere access to peer review records satisfied this requirement.' 2
Three years later, the Seventh Circuit was given the opportunity to answer
these questions in Tambone v. Memorial Hospital for McHenry County.'83
Unlike Marrese, Dr. Tambone's hospital staff privileges had actually been
revoked as a result of a series of hearings instigated in 1974 by Memorial
Hospital in Woodstock, Illinois. 8 4 In determining whether the state action
doctrine insulated the defendants' actions from Tambone's antitrust chal-
lenge,'85 the court held Marrese controlling and proceeded to apply the
Midcal analysis to the Illinois statutory scheme.' 8 6
The Seventh Circuit simply affirmed the district court's extensive analysis8 7
as to whether the Illinois statutory scheme satisfied the first prong of
Midcal.'8 s Before 1983, Illinois had no statute that required or regulated peer
review activities. Rather, there was a broad delegation of authority to the
Director of the Department of Public Health to regulate the operation of
Illinois hospitals. 8 9 Although the Director had promulgated rules requiring
peer review pursuant to this authority,' 9° the court found "such a broad,
180. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
181. Quinn, 617 F. Supp. at 1234.
182. As Miles & Philp note, the "active supervision" supplied by the then-existing Indiana
statute was dubious. Miles & Philp, supra note 17, at 506-07. Although the statutes required
inspection of hospital records generally by the Hospital Licensing Council, they merely allowed
disclosure of peer review records to the Indiana Medical Licensing Board. Consistent review of
records was essentially assumed by the court, although it appeared "highly unlikely that the
state would ever learn of the hospital's credentialing proceedings, much less that it could correct
an abuse even if it were discovered." Id. at 507.
183. 825 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1987).
184. Tambone v. Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County, 635 F. Supp. 508, 509 (N.D. Il1.
1986), aff'd, 825 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1987). The records of the hospital's Credentials and
Nominating Committee indicated that the committee "found Dr. Tambone 'unqualified as to
competency and professional standing' and recommended to the hospital's medical staff that
his application be rejected." Id. at 510.
185. Dr. Tambone filed suit against Memorial Hospital for McHenry County, the Kishwakee
Valley Medical group and the hospital peer review committee members. 825 F.2d at 1133. He
alleged a conspiracy among the defendants to make it impossible for him to practice medicine
in Woodstock, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. The defendants, relying on
Marrese, claimed their actions as peer review members were exempt from antitrust liability
based on the state action doctrine. Id. at 1134.
186. Id. at 1133. Essentially, the district court outlined the Indiana statutory system that
existed in Marrese as a basis of comparison with the Illinois statutory system. Id. at 1134.
187. Tambone, 635 F. Supp 508 (N.D. I11. 1986).
188. 825 F.2d 1132, 1134 (7th Cir. 1987).
189. Tambone, 635 F. Supp. at 511-12.
190. Id. at 511-12. The Director's regulations regarding peer review were mandatory. "These
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amorphous grant of authority" insufficient to establish "clear articulation"
of Illinois state policy.' g9 The court, relying on Southern Motor, held that
the articulation must be traced to the legislature.' 92
However, the district court, relying on Marrese found that the Illinois
statute granting good faith immunity' 93 was "sufficient" to satisfy the first
prong of Midcal. 194 The Seventh Circuit agreed that statutory good faith
immunity could establish "clear articulation" because such statutes "dem-
onstrate[] a state policy in favor of peer review committees by providing
good faith immunity from civil damages to members of such committees."' 95
However, such a statutory grant of good faith immunity was insufficient to
satisfy the "active supervision" prong of the Midcal test.' 96
The Seventh Circuit essentially agreed with the district court's finding that
the Illinois statutes did not provide active supervision of the peer review
process prior to 1983.'19 Indeed, all of the statutes and regulations presented
by the defendants were concerned only with the licensing of hospitals and
doctors, not peer review. 9 At most, these statutes indicated that prior to
1983, the Illinois statutes "may have tolerated" the existence of peer review,
which was found not satisfactory as "active supervision.' ' 199
regulations clearly indicate that peer review committees are a functional necessity if Illinois
hospitals are to comply with the regulations issued by the Director of the Illinois Department
of Public Health." Id. at 512.
191. Id. at 513.
192. Id. at 510. The court explained as follows:
To meet the first prong of the state action test, the policy invoked must be clearly
articulated by the state itself. Thus, if the source of the policy is the state legislature,
the policy must be clearly embodied in a statute .... Although the details of how
the anticompetitive conduct may be pursued can be left to regulation by state
agencies, state agencies acting alone cannot immunize anticompetitive conduct. The
intent to condone the challenged conduct must be clearly articulated by the legislature
itself.
Id. (citations omitted).
193. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4406 (1978) (this statute has since been repealed, however
the analysis remains the same for purposes of this Note).
194. Tambone, 635 F. Supp. at 513. Indeed, although the Marrese court implied that such
statutes would be useful in establishing clear articulation of policy, the district court asserted
that such statutes were a "clear expression" of state policy. Id.
The court did, however, acknowledge that at least one court has disagreed with this approach.
Id. at 513 n.2 (citing Quinn v. Kent General Hosp., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Del. 1985)).
The Quinn court's approach requires a clear statutory indication that the legislature intended
fo displace competition, rather than mere authorization or promotion of the peer review process.
617 F. Supp. at 1238-39. The district court in Tambone considered this approach "ill-founded."
635 F. Supp. at 513 n.2.
195. Tambone, 825 F.2d at 1134.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1135. In 1983, the Illinois legislature passed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para.
4437(a)(1), which made reports to the Illinois State Medical Disciplinary Board of hospital peer
review determinations mandatory. Id. at 1134-35.
198. Id. at 1134.
199. Id. at 1135. The district court found two distinguishing features between the Illinois
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III. PATRICK V. BURGET
A. Facts and Procedural History
Dr. Timothy Patrick, a general and vascular surgeon, came to Astoria,
Oregon in 1972.2 0 He joined the staff at Astoria Clinic and received staff
privileges at Columbia Memorial Hospital. 20 1 Columbia Memorial was the
only hospital in Astoria. 20 2 The majority of Columbia Memorial's medical
staff were also partners or employees of the Astoria Clinic. 203 In 1973, at
the expiration of his one year contract, Dr. Patrick was invited to become
a partner at the clinic. Patrick refused the invitation and opened a private
practice which competed with the Clinic from 1979 to 1981 .
2 4
Over the years, the relationship between Dr. Patrick and the physicians
at Astoria Clinic was strained and turbulent. 205 The clinic physicians did not
refer patients to Dr. Patrick, but to other general surgeons over 50 miles
away. 206 At the same time, they were reluctant to accept referrals from
and Indiana statutory scheme existing prior to 1983 which lent support to the court's conclusion
that inspection of peer review records was more likely to occur under Indiana's structure.
Tambone, 635 F. Supp. at 515. As the district court illustrated:
First, although transmission of all adverse peer review determinations to the Indiana
Medical Licensing Board did not become mandatory until 1983 .... the predecessor
statute . . . clearly contemplated the routine forwarding of peer review materials to
appropriate registration and licensure boards for action by the state. No such statute
or regulation, permissive or mandatory, appears to have existed in Illinois ...
Second, review of Indiana hospitals by representatives of the State Board of Health
was and still is required on a periodic basis. Inspections by the Illinois Department
of Health were and still are discretionary.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals noted yet another distinction: the statutory right of appeal to Indiana
state courts from adverse peer review decisions. Tambone, 825 F.2d at 1134.
200. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 486 U.S. 94 (1988). Astoria is
a city of 10,000 people located in Northwest Oregon. 800 F.2d at 1502.
201. Id.
202. Id. The next nearest primary hospital was Ocean Beach Hospital in Ilwaco, Washington.
Columbia Memorial was a secondary hospital capable of handling some types of complex
surgery. Id.
203. Id. The other physicians at the clinic named as defendants in the suit include William
Burget, Jorma Leinasser, Richard Kettlekamp, Patrick Meyer, Gary Boelling, Robert Niekes,
Franklin Russell, Leigh Dolin, Richard Harris, Daniel Rappaport, and Tzu Sung Chiang. Id.
204. Id. Dr. Patrick chose to open an independent practice because he believed he had not
been paid enough in relation to the income he had produced for the clinic. Id. Dr. James
Weber worked for Dr. Patrick as a general surgeon for three years until he was fired in 1981.
Dr. Weber then established his own independent practice in Astoria. Id.
205. Id. The court noted that the clinic physicians "reacted negatively" to Dr. Patrick's
independent practice. Id.
206. Id. The clinic physicians were said to react angrily if Dr. Patrick treated any clinic
patient. Confrontations resulted from the alleged theft of patients. Id.
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Patrick. 20 7 Clinic physicians contended that they did not want to deal with
Patrick because of his "contentiousness and lack of skill. ' '20
In 1979, the bad feelings between Patrick and the clinic physicians esca-
lated. 20 9 Eventually, Columbia Hospital reported Patrick to the Oregon Board
of Medical Examiners ('BOME) 21 0 over his handling of the "Willie" case 21'
and fourteen other cases. 212 A physician on the staff of Astoria clinic, Dr.
Russell, chaired the BOME investigative committee.2 1 a The BOME issued
Patrick a letter of reprimand based on the fifteen cases. 21 4 Patrick thought
the review pertained only to the Willie case.21 5 He objected to the letter and
requested a new hearing. 216 Dr. Tanaka, BOME chairman, agreed the letter
was erroneous but refused to withdraw it.217 Only after Patrick filed a petition
for judicial review did the BOME retract the letter. 21
After the BOME investigation, Patrick's problems with the clinic physi-
cians continued. At Columbia Hospital, Patrick's cases were closely moni-
tored while the cases of other physicians with serious problems were
unreviewed. 219 In 1981, the medical staff instituted proceedings to terminate
207. Id. For example, the clinic physicians refused to treat Dr. Patrick's patients when he
was out of town. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1503. The clinic physicians attacked Dr. Weber in various ways. However, as
soon as Dr. Weber left Dr. Patrick's employment, he was asked to join the clinic staff. Id.
210. Id. Hospitals are common sources of information for state medical boards. Over 40
states require hospitals to report revocations of staff privileges. See Newald, Watchful Eyes to
Follow Physicians Through '87, HOSPITALS, Jan. 5, 1987, at 49.
211. 800 F.2d at 1503. After performing an operation on Mr. Willie, Dr. Patrick went away
for the weekend and left his associate, Dr. Weber, in charge of the case. Dr. Weber checked
Mr. Willie on Sunday morning before he also left town. Dr. Weber left Dr. Linehan, a general
practitioner, in charge of the case. Dr. Patrick was due back on Sunday afternoon. Mr. Willie's
condition suddenly deteriorated. Dr. Linehan, feeling unsure of his competency to handle the
situation, asked Dr. Boelling for help. Boelling declined and Dr Harris, a clinic physician, was
assigned to the case by the hospital chief of staff. Boelling complained to the hospital over the
handling of the Willie case. This incident prompted the reporting of Dr. Patrick to the BOME.
Id.
212. Id. See also Dolin, Antitrust Law Versus Peer Review, 313 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1156
(Oct. 31, 1985) (Patrick defendant discussing two other cases of Dr. Patrick which were reported
to BOME).
213. 800 F.2d at 1503.
214. Id. The letter, drafted by Dr. Russell and edited by the BOME administrator, criticized
Dr. Patrick's handling of the Willie case and noted that Patrick was generally careless in his
medical practices. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. A meeting was held with Dr. Tanaka, the BOME chairman, where Dr. Patrick
admitted that the BOME's criticism of the Willie case was justified. Id.
217. Id. Dr. Tanaka admitted the letter overstated the matters but refused to retract it because
Dr. Russell indicated he knew of other cases of Patrick's that merited the criticism. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1503-04. The unequal treatment by the peer review committee was evidenced by
a series of incidents involving Dr. McLaughlin. McLaughlin, an alcoholic who could not be
reached during drinking binges, suffered a breakdown during an operation, and appeared in
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Patrick's staff privileges at the hospital, alleging that Patrick's patients
received substandard care.220 The charges against Patrick focused on ap-
proximately nine cases.22' Patrick was granted a hearing by the termination
committee but the physicians at the hearing were uncooperative.222 Not
wanting a revocation of privileges to appear on his record, Patrick resigned
from Columbia Hospital before the committee rendered its decision. 223
In 1981, Patrick filed suit in federal district court challenging the peer
review committee's actions and the impending termination of his privileges.22 4
He alleged that the partners of the Astoria Clinic violated sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act.225 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Patrick. 226
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the trial court.227 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that there was
substantial evidence that the defendants had acted in bad faith.22  However,
the court held the committee to be immune from antitrust liability based on
the state action doctrine. 229 The court interpreted Oregon statutes as estab-
lishing a policy that compelled physicians to review their competitors. 230
Thus, the policy satisfied the clear articulation prong of the Midcal test.23 '
the emergency room intoxicated. He failed to report his drinking problems to the BOME. None
of the incidents were scrutinized by the hospital peer review committee. In fact, McLaughlin
received a substantial number of referrals from Astoria Clinic. He was even elected Chief of
Staff of the hospital. Id. at 1504 n.4.
220. Id. at 1504.
221. Id. Patrick performed between 2,000 and 2,500 surgeries during the relevant time period.
At trial, the court held that the jury easily could have concluded that the errors in the nine
cases did not justify termination of Patrick's staff privileges. Id.
222. Id. The committee was said to be "inattentive" while Patrick was trying to present his
defense. Furthermore, when requested to testify by Patrick's attorney, committee members
refused to comment on the cases or their relationships with Patrick. Patrick was convinced that
the outcome of the hearing was "preordained." Id.
223. Id. Patrick was later granted staff privileges at Ocean Beach Hospital.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1504. Patrick also alleged violations of state law. Id.
226. Id. at 1504-05:
The jury returned a verdict against Drs. Russell, Boelling and Harris on the section
1 count, against the 'The Astoria Clinic' on the section 2 count, and awarded
Patrick $650,000 for the antitrust violations, which the court trebled. The jury also
awarded $20,000 in compensatory and $90,000 in punitive damages against Boelling,
Russell and Harris on the state law claim. The court awarded Patrick $228,600 in
attorney's fees.
Id.
227. Id. at 1501-02.
228. Id. at 1507. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that substantial evidence showed that the
defendants had acted with bad faith in both the peer review process and the BOME proceedings.
Id.
229. Id. at 1501.
230. Id. at 1505-06. "Oregon, by compelling physicians to review their competitors, affir-
matively has expressed a policy to replace pure competition with some regulation." Id. (footnote
omitted).
231. Id. For discussion of the Midcal test, see supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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The court also held that Oregon actively supervised the peer review process. 23 2
All adverse staffing decisions were reported to the BOME per Oregon
statutes. 233 Furthermore, adverse staffing decisions were held to be judicially
reviewable by courts.3 4 The Ninth Circuit found that hospital review, BOME
review, and judicial review constituted active state supervision thereby sat-
isfying the second prong of the Midcal test. 235 Because both prongs of the
Midcal test were satisfied, the court of appeals held that the members of
the peer review committee had immunity from antitrust liability. 23 6
B. Supreme Court's Holding
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that
the state action doctrine did not protect Oregon physicians from federal
antitrust liability for their peer review activities.23 7 Addressing only the second
prong of the Midcal test, 238 the Court held that no state actor actively
supervised the peer review decision process of Oregon hospitals. 2 9 Conse-
quently, no immunity could be afforded under the state action doctrine. In
its analysis, the Court defined the active supervision prong of the Midcal
test in two parts: first, the state, must have the power to review the decision;
and second, the state must have power to disapprove the peer review action.
24
0
To apply the test, the Court examined the role of three possible state actors
and held that none actively supervised peer review activities. 24' Finally, the
Court noted that policy issues raised by exposing the health care industry to
antitrust liability should be directed to Congress. 242
232. Id. at 1506. Oregon hospitals are under a statutory obligation to establish peer review
procedures and to review those procedures on a regular basis. See OR. REV. STAT. § 441.055(3)(c)-
(d) (1987).
233. 800 F.2d at 1506. See OR. REV. STAT. § 441.820(1) (1987) (requiring prompt written
report anytime health care facility restricts or terminates physician's privileges).
234. 800 F.2d at 1506. "Oregon courts have reviewed adverse privilege decisions to determine
if they were made in good faith pursuant to fair procedures and were supported by the facts."
Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1507 ("[alctions within the scope of a state official's authority, taken pursuant
to express state policy, which are contemplated by the statutory scheme, are actions of the state
and therefore immune").
237. 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988).
238. The Court stated that the "clear articulation" prong of the Midcal test need not be
considered because the "active supervision" prong was not satisfied. Id. at 100.
239. Id. at 105.
240. Id. at 101. "The active supervision prong . . . requires that state officials have and
exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those
that fail to accord with state policy." Id.
241. Id. at 1663-65. The three state actors examined by the Court were the Oregon Health
Division, the BOME, and the state judiciary system.
242. Id. The Court was "not unmindful" of the policy argument that subjecting peer review
members to antitrust liability may have a chilling effect on peer review activities. Id.
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In examining the first possible state actor, the Supreme Court considered
the Oregon Health Division, which has general supervisory powers over all
health matters in the State.243 Oregon law requires health care facilities to
establish peer review procedures and to periodically review those proce-
dures. 24 In its general supervisory capacity, the Health Division ensures that
such committees are established. 245 However, because the Health Division
has no statutory power to review or alter peer group decisions, the Court
concluded that it was not a state actor capable of satisfying the active
supervision requirement.2 46 Statutory authority over peer review procedure
does not constitute active supervision of private privilege determinations. 247
Oregon law also requires that any termination or restriction of staff
privileges be reported to the BOME. 241 However, Oregon law does not give
the BOME the authority to review staff decisions.2 49 There was no indication
243. OR. REV. STAT. § 431.110(1) (1987) (giving the Health Division "direct supervision of
all matters relating to the preservation of life and health of the people of the state").
244. OR. REV. STAT. § 441.055(3)(c)-(d) (1987):
(3) The governing body of each health care facility shall be responsible for the
operation of the facility, the selection of the medical staff and the quality of care
rendered in the facility. The governing body shall:
(c) Insure that procedures for granting, restricting and terminating privileges exist
and that such procedures are regularly reviewed to assure their conformity to
applicable law, and
(d) Insure that physicians admitted to practice in the facility are organized into a
medical staff in such a manner as to effectively review the professional practices
of the facility for the purposes of reducing morbidity and mortality and for the
improvement of patient care.
Id.
245. OR. REV. STAT. § 431.150(2) (1987).
246. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 102. The Health Division's statutory authority over peer review
was limited to authority over a hospital's procedures and did not extend to the actual decisions
of the peer review committee. Id. In fact, the authority over the peer review procedure was
itself limited and did not give the Health Division the authority to review the quality of the
procedures. Instead, the Health Division was merely authorized to force a hospital to comply
with its obligation to establish and review peer review procedures. Id. at 102 n.6.
247. Id. at 102. The Court stated, "Itlhe state does not actively supervise a restraint by peer
review committees unless a state official has and exercises ultimate authority over private
privilege determinations." Id.
248. OR. REV. STAT. § 441.820(l)-(2) (1987):
(1) When a health care facility restricts or terminates the privileges of a physician
to practice medicine at that facility, it shall promptly report, in writing, to the
Board of Medical Examiners for the State of Oregon all the facts and circumstances
that resulted in the restriction or termination.
(2) A health care facility which reports or provides information to the Board of
Medical Examiners for the State of Oregon under this section and which provides
information in good faith shall not be subject to an action for civil damages as a
result thereof.
Id.
249. Id. at 103. "The apparent purpose of the reporting requirement is to give the BOME
an opportunity to determine whether additional action on its part, such as revocation of a
physician's license, is warranted." Id. (footnote omitted).
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in the statute that the BOME could change a peer review committee deci-
sion.250 Instead, the statute was primarily a reporting mechanism. 25' Thus,
because the BOME did not actively supervise private peer review decisions,
the Court held that the agency was not a state actor capable of satisfying
the second prong of the Midcal test. 252
The Supreme Court also considered whether the state judiciary possessed
the necessary supervisory authority. State judicial review of privilege termi-
nation decisions, if it existed at all, was limited to a review of procedural
reasonableness. 211 "Such constricted review," the Court stated, does not
convert private decisions into state action.2 4 The Court refused to decide
whether judicial review of private conduct could ever constitute active su-
pervision. Instead, it merely held that no such judicial review existed under
Oregon statutes or case law. 255
The Court recognized the policy argument that the quality of health care
may decline if the threat of antitrust liability discourages physicians from
participating in peer review proceedings. 2 6 The Court concluded, however,
that any decision about the wisdom of applying the antitrust laws to the
health care setting was best left to Congress. 2 7 The Court stated that unless
Congress insulated peer review activities, each state would be responsible for
this task by conforming with the state action doctrine.
21
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. (noting that respondents did not show the BOME in practice has ever asserted any
authority to review or reverse privilege decisions).
253. Id. at 104-05. The Court considered two Oregon Supreme Court decisions, Straube v.
Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 287 Or. 375, 600 P.2d 381 (1979), and Huffaker v. Bailey,
273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398 (1975), and noted that these courts assumed but did not decide
whether a physician is entitled to review of peer review decisions. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 104-05.
The Straube court, however, stated that a court "should [not] decide the merits of plaintiff's
dismissal." Straube, 287 Or. at 384, 600 P.2d at 386.
254. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105.
255. Id. at 104. But see Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d 1273 (lth Cir
1988) (court found that Florida's statutory scheme which provided for probing judicial review
board decisions constituted "active state supervision" sufficient to invoke state action doctrine),
vacated, 874 F.2d 755 (lth Cir. 1989).
256. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 104.
257. Id.
258. Id. The Court acknowledged that Congress insulated certain medical peer review activities
from antitrust liability in the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§
11101-11152 (Supp. V 1987). "The Act, which was enacted well after the events at issue in this
case and is not retroactive, essentially immunizes peer-review from liability if the action was
taken 'in the reasonable belief that lit] was in the furtherance of quality health care."' 486
U.S. at 105 n.8. Because the Act expressly preserves other "immunities under the law," including
the state action immunity, states may immunize peer review action that does not meet the
federal standard. "In enacting this measure, Congress clearly noted and responded to the
concern that the possibility of antitrust liability will discourage effective peer review. If physicians
believe that the Act provides insufficient immunity to protect the peer review process fully,
they must take that matter up with Congress." 486 U.S. at 105 n.8.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. State Statutes Did Not Constitute "Active Supervision"
In Patrick, the physician defendants on the peer review committee claimed
immunity for their actions under the state action doctrine. When the Court
rejected this defense it acted consistently with prior case law259 and further
defined the active supervision requirement. In so doing, the Court expanded
the requirement of active supervision necessary to a defense based on the
state action doctrine. To satisfy this prong of the Midcal test a defendant
must now show that the state actor has both the power to review and the
power to disapprove of a peer review decision. 260
As previously mentioned, it is well settled that antitrust liability extends
to professions. 26' However, Patrick represents the first United States Supreme
Court case in which antitrust liability was extended to peer review committee
members in a private hospital. The Court held that the state action doctrine
did not protect the physicians from federal antitrust liability because the
active supervision requirement of the Midcal test was not satisfied.2 62 Peer
review committee members, like any other defendant attempting to raise the
state action doctrine defense, will receive immunity only if both prongs of
the state action doctrine test are satisfied. 263
The Patrick Court applied only prong two of the Midcal test. 261 Many
previous Supreme Court decisions have stressed one prong of the state action
doctrine over the other. 265 The reason this Court focused on the active
supervision prong was because the defendants had not satisfied it, therefore
it was unnecessary to consider the clear articulation prong. 266
259. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48
(1985) (collective ratemaking immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine);
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) (municipality exempt from antitrust
liability by state action doctrine); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (state action found
in admission procedure for Arizona State Bar); California Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (California's wine pricing system not immune under state
action doctrine); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (minimum fee schedule
not exempt from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine).
260. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
261. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
262. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988).
263. Id. at 100.
264. Id. The Court stated that it need not consider the clear articulation prong of the Midcal
test because the active supervision requirement was not satisfied. Id.
265. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) (active supervision not a
prerequisite to exemption for municipality); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985) (clear articulation prong emphasized because respondent
conceded active supervision prong); California Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97 (1980) (court imposed antitrust liability because no active supervision).
266. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100.
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In Patrick, the Court further developed the active supervision prong, by
stating that the active supervision prong consisted of two requirements. First,
state officials must "have and exercise power to review particular anticom-
petitive acts of private parties. 2 67 Second, state officials must have the
power to "disapprove those [anticompetitive acts] that fail to accord with
state policy. ' 268 According to the Court, active state supervision was nec-
essary to a state action doctrine defense because only those anticompetitive
acts which promote state policy are protected. 269
The Court looked to the State Health Division, the BOME, and the state
judicial system when it considered whether the state fulfilled the active
supervision requirement over peer review activities. 270 In applying the Midcal
test, the Court correctly concluded that the activities of the Health Division
did not satisfy either requirement of the active supervision prong. The Health
Division may have had the power to deny, suspend, or revoke the license of
any hospital that did not establish peer review procedures as mandated by
statute,2 71 but it did not have the power to review private peer review
decisions.2 72 Also, there was no indication that the Health Division could
change a peer review decision which failed to accord with state policy. 273
Thus, without the statutory authority to review or alter peer review decisions,
the Court indicated the Health Division was not a state actor capable of
satisfying the active supervision requirement of the Midcal test.
Moreover, the Court correctly concluded that the activities of Oregon's
BOME did not satisfy either requirement of the active supervision prong.
All decisions to terminate or restrict staff privileges were reported to the
BOME as provided for by Oregon statute. 274 The Court stated that the
respondents did not demonstrate that the BOME actively reviewed privilege
decisions .275 Rather, the BOME determined if further action should be taken
against a physician such as revocation of a license. The Court also stated
that no Oregon statute indicated that the BOME had the power to disapprove
of a peer review decision.27 6 Considering that the BOME did not actively
267. Id. at 101.
268. Id.
269. Id. (explaining that the active supervision requirement is designed to ensure that only
those anticompetitive acts of private parties which further state regulatory policies will be
sheltered).
270. Id. at 101-05. The Court stated that neither the Ninth Circuit nor the respondents
indicated how any of these entities reviewed private hospital decisions. Id.
271. Id. at 102. The Health Division had general supervisory power. It licensed hospitals,
enforced health laws, and could sanction any hospital that failed to establish peer review
committees. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 103. The Court found that OR. REV. STAT. § 441.820(1) required that all decisions
by Oregon hospitals be reported to the BOME that involved a restriction or termination of a
physician's privileges. Id.
275. Id. at 103.
276. Id.
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review or reverse staff privilege decisions by peer review committees, the
Court held the BOME was not a state actor capable of satisfying the active
supervision prong of the Midcal test.
The Patrick Court offered no example of a state statutory scheme in
which immunity for peer review committees had been achieved through the
state action doctrine. However, in Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit had previously held that Indiana's statutory scheme-which mandated
and actively supervised medical peer review activities-satisfied the active
supervision prong of the state action doctrine. 2"1 For example, Indiana as a
matter of state policy mandated that hospital medical staffs form peer review
committees. 278 In addition, the Indiana Medical Licensing Board enacted,
promulgated, and enforced rules of competent medical practice within the
state and monitored review committee records. 279 Furthermore, the Indiana
Hospital Licensing Council, in addition to establishing standards for hos-
pitals, reviewed the records of peer review committees. 280
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the peer review
committee in Marrese was exempt from federal antitrust liability because the
extensive statutory scheme of Indiana satisfied the state action doctrine. 28'
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit in Patrick found the Oregon statutory scheme
very similar to the Indiana statutes. 28 2 The Supreme Court, however, held
that the Oregon scheme was not sufficient to satisfy the active supervision
prong of the state action doctrine. 283 It follows, therefore, that Marrese
would be decided differently today, and that the Indiana statutes, like the
Oregon statutes, would not satisfy the state action doctrine.
B. Judicial Review
In Patrick, the Court did not decide the broad issue of whether judicial
review of a private staff privilege decision would ever amount to state action.
Instead, the Court held that the judicial review in Oregon as it existed, fell
short of satisfying the active supervision requirement of the Midcal test.28 4
The Court initiated its analysis of judicial review by looking for statutory
mandates for review of private staffing decisions. The Court concluded that
there was no express statute providing for judicial review of private staffing
decisions in Oregon to satisfy the active supervision requirement. 285
277. Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 388 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1027 (1985).
278. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1506 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding Indiana's statutory
scheme "nearly identical" to Oregon's),.rev'd, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
283. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105.
284. Id. at 105.
285. Id. Oregon had no express statute providing for judicial review of staff privilege
termination decisions.
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The Court next turned to Oregon case law to determine if judicial review
satisfied the active supervision requirement. The Court noted that Oregon
courts had never affirmatively held that a physician in a private hospital
whose privileges were revoked could seek relief in court. 2 6 For example, in
Huffaker v. Bailey, the Oregon Supreme Court merely held that as long as
a denial of privileges was made in good faith and supported by fact, courts
should not invalidate it.287
Similarly, in Straube v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Board, the Oregon
Supreme Court again advocated judicial restraint.288 The Straube court clearly
stated that it had not decided whether a physician was entitled to judicial
review as a common law right. 289 Instead, the Oregon Supreme Court stated
that a court should not decide the "merits" of a staff privilege case but
rather limit its inquiry to determining if "reasonable procedure" was af-
forded to a physician. 290
After considering these decisions, the Supreme Court remarked that Huf-
faker and Straube advocated judicial restraint and thus failed to meet the
active supervision prong of the Midcal test. 29' Moreover, the Court stated
that Oregon courts indicated that even if they provided judicial review, it
would be a very limited review and would avoid the merits of a decision. 292
The Court stated that such limited review would not satisfy the active
supervision requirement 293 because the active supervision prong requires a
defendant to show both the power to review and the power to disapprove.
According to the Court, merely reviewing procedural aspects of a peer review
decision does not constitute power to disapprove the merits of the decision. 294
When it analyzed Oregon's judicial review, the Patrick Court made an
important distinction between procedural review and review on the merits
of a case with regards to the state supervision requirement. By rejecting
procedural review as too constricted, it follows that a broader review of the
merits of a case might satisfy the active supervision requirement. 295 However,
the Court's reluctance to decide this question raises the additional question
of how broad a review on the merits need be before it constitutes active
supervision.
286. Id.
287. Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 280-81, 540 P.2d 1398, 1399 (1975).
288. 287 Or. 375, 383, 600 P.2d 381, 386 (1979).
289. Id. at 375, 600 P.2d at 384.
290. Id. at 384, 600 P.2d at 386.
291. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105.
292. Id. at 104.
293. Id. at 105.
294. See infra notes 295-301 and accompanying text.
295. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105. Although not explicitly endorsing review on the merits, the
Court stated, "[u]nder the standard suggested by the Oregon Supreme Court, a state court
would not review the merits of a privilege termination decision to determine whether it accorded
with state regulatory policy." Id. See also Cross & Berman, Hospital Peer Review and the
State Action Doctrine After Patrick, 3 ANTITRUST 14, 19 (Fall 1988).
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Because the Court declined to address the broad issue of whether judicial
review of a private staff privilege decision would ever satisfy the state action
doctrine, 296 it also failed to provide examples of judicial review which might
satisfy the requirements of the Midcal test. Accordingly, whether state action
would be found in states following the minority approach-which subjects
the staffing decisions of private hospitals to judicial scrutiny-is not clear. 297
Without affirmative guidance from the Court, lower courts in states sub-
scribing to the Greisman29 philosophy must infer the standard which would
satisfy the Midcal test. 299 If judicial review is such that it may consider and
reverse the peer review decision based on the merits, it follows that such
judicial review would satisfy the test. Whether the Greisman approach is an
example of such judicial review is less clear. The general rule is that peer
review committees receive great deference in their decisions. 3°° The Greisman
line of cases provides broader review than the majority and refuses to
distinguish between public and private hospitals. 01 Nevertheless, even those
courts which review private hospital decisions afford deference to the hos-
pitals on the merits, reasoning that these types of decisions are better left
to professional judgment.30 2 Under the Patrick Court's requirements, quite
possibly, no jurisdiction's judicial review will satisfy the active supervision
prong of the state action doctrine.
At present, courts still have not determined whether judicial review satisfies
the active supervision prong of the Midcal test. However, in a decision now
vacated, the Eleventh Circuit held, in Bolt v. Halifax Hospital Medical
Center, that Florida's judicial review of staff privilege decisions constituted
active supervision for purposes of the state action doctrine.0 3 Although
vacated on the issue of judicial review, the decision still merits consideration.
The facts in Bolt were similar to those in Patrick.3° Applying the first prong
296. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 104. The Court acknowledged that it never previously considered
whether state courts, acting in their judicial capacity, can ever satisfy the state action doctrine.
All prior Supreme Court cases involved administrative agencies or state supreme courts acting
in an agency-like capacity. Id.
297. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
298. Id.
299. The Patrick Court stated, when it referred to the limited review in Oregon, "[sluch
constricted review [where 'a state court would not review the merits of a privilege termination
decision'] does not convert the action of a private party in terminating a physician's privileges
into the action of the State for purposes of the state-action doctrine." Patrick, 486 U.S. at
105.
300. See Woodard v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 423, 217 A.2d 37, 40 (1966) (policies
of a private hospital will not be subject to judicial review unless arbitrary, capricious, or
discriminatory) (citing Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963)).
301. See Nodzenski, supra note 26, at 972-74 (discussing Greisman and the rationale behind
the minority approach).
302. See Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.
1971). See also Trail & Kelley-Claybrook, supra note 26, at 340.
303. 851 F.2d 1273, 1282 (lth Cir. 1988), vacated, 874 F.2d 755 (11th Cir. 1989).
304. Dr. Bolt had his staff privileges at three hospitals revoked for refusing to enter an
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of the Midcal test, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Florida law provided
a clearly articulated state policy authorizing peer review. 05 In considering
the second prong of the Midcal test, the Court noted that no Florida statute
established a state program of active supervision over peer review decisions.
3 °6
However, the court held that judicial review of staff privilege decisions by
Florida courts constituted active supervision for purposes of the state action
doctrine.3 °7 Florida courts had reviewed staff privileges decisions to determine
if termination were based on fair procedures, valid criteria, and sufficient
evidence. 0 Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the portions of the
Bolt decision dealing with judicial review.3 °9 Clearly the limited judicial review
afforded by the Florida courts would not have satisfied the active supervision
requirement as defined by the Supreme Court in Patrick. In Patrick, the
Court indicated that a state court must review the merits of a staff privilege
decision to satisfy the active supervision requirement. °10 The scope of judicial
review afforded by Florida courts, which examines the fairness of procedure,
validity of dismissal criteria, and the sufficiency of the evidence, does not
include review of the merits of a staff privilege decision."'
Since Patrick, with the exception of the vacated Bolt decision, no lower
court has held that judicial review may constitute active supervision to
provide immunity under the state action doctrine.31 2 Some courts simply
refuse to address the issue."' In the alternative, other courts apply the strict
standard set forth in the dicta of Patrick, that is, to qualify as active
supervision, any judicial review would have to address the merits of the
impaired physician's program as directed by a reappointment committee. Upon revocation of
his privileges, Dr. Bolt filed suit against the hospitals, the medical staffs, and a local medical
society based on antitrust claims. Id. at 1275-77.
305. Id. at 1281.
306. Id. at 1281-82. Section 458.337(l)(b) of the Florida statutes required that the Florida
Board of Medical Examiners ("BOME") be notified whenever a physician was disciplined.
However, the BOME had no power to overturn a peer review decision. FLA. STAT. § 458.337(l)(b)
(1981). Thus, the BOME was not a state actor capable of satisfying the state action doctrine.
307. Bolt, 851 F.2d at 1283. Florida courts construe hospital bylaws as a contract between
the physician and the hospital. A physician may obtain injunctive relief if a hospital revokes
his privileges in violation of hospital bylaws. Id.
308. Id.
309. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 874 F.2d 755 (1 1th Cir. 1989). See also Cross &
Berman, supra note 295, at 19 ("the Bolt decision may only serve to confuse the issues
further").
310. 486 U.S. 94, 105. The Court indicated that limited judicial review of the reasonableness
of the procedure afforded to a physician would not satisfy the active supervision requirement.
Id.
311. See Bolt, 851 F.2d at 1284.
312. E.g., Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., 880 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1989); Shahawy v.
Harrison, 875 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989); Jiricko v. Coffeyville Memorial Hosp. Medical
Center, 700 F. Supp. 1559 (D. Kan. 1988).
313. E.g., Jiricko v. Coffeyville Memorial Hosp. Medical Center, 700 F. Supp. 1559, 1563
(D. Kan. 1988).
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decision.3 14 In applying this strict standard, these latter courts hold that since
their judicial decisions involve procedural reviews, the active supervision
prong as described in Patrick is not met.3"5
C. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
With the strict standard set forth in Patrick and the uncertainty of the
jurisdictional defense, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 198616
may be the most viable way of insulating peer review activities from antitrust
liability. In a footnote, the Patrick Court referred to the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986 as another possible way of insulating certain peer
review activities from antitrust liability.3 17
Although the Court did not thoroughly explain the Act or its implications,
it did acknowledge that the Act is based on a good faith standard as an
effective method of providing immunity to peer review committees.3' 8 In this
footnote, the Court went on to suggest that even if peer review activity did
not meet the standards of the federal Act, states were not prevented from
immunizing any peer review activity through the state action doctrine or
314. E.g., Pinhas, 880 F.2d at 1113-14; Shahawy, 875 F.2d at 1535-36.
315. In California, judicial review is limited to "an examination of the record of the hospital
proceedings to determine whether the action taken was substantially irrational, unlawful or
contrary to established public policy or procedurally unfair." Pinhas, 880 F.2d at 1114. In
Florida, judicial review occurs only when "a peer review board uses unfair or unreasonable
procedures, or when a board arbitrarily or capriciously applies its procedures." Shahawy, 875
F.2d at 1536. See Note, Judicial Review as Midcal Active Supervision: Immunizing Private
Parties from Antitrust Liability, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 403 (1988). The author concludes that
judicial review should satisfy the Midcal active supervision requirement. However, the author
does not advocate stricter application of the Midcal test-that is, review on the merits. Id. at
423. Instead, the author stated that a review on the merits would either force a state to "install
a full regulatory apparatus, or to withdraw in favor of competition." Id. at 422, n.125.
316. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (Supp. V 1987). See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying
text for discussion of the Act.
317. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105 n.8. See also Comment, supra note 36, at 1073. The author
states that the Act provides immunity under federal and state law from damage suits against
peer review groups and individuals acting in support of these groups, preserving only civil rights
actions. Id. at 1091. Under the act, a physician in direct competition with the physician facing
discipline is prohibited from sitting on the peer review panel. The author goes on to state:
The grant of immunity in the Act is conditioned on two factors. First, a peer review
group must provide sufficient due process protections to a physician subjected to
peer review action. The Act specifically details the procedures Congress deemed to
be appropriate due process, and creates a rebuttable presumption that the peer
review group met the due process requirements even if the group did not follow
the procedures in the Act. Second, the peer review group must take the disciplinary
action in the reasonable belief that the action will further quality health care. ...
Part A also conditions the peer review group's immunity on faithful reporting of
disciplinary action to the national data bank.
Id. at 1091-92.
318. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105 n.8.
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state immunity statutes. 19 However the Court offered little guidance as to
the application and impact of the Act on this area of law.
The Court did not apply the Act in Patrick because it could not be applied
retroactively to the events of the case.320 Moreover, the Court gave no
indication as to how the results in Patrick would have differed if the Act
had been applied to the facts in the case. Instead, the Court relied solely on
the state action doctrine. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act is
largely based on a good faith standard.3 2 ' Given the facts of Patrick, even
if the Supreme Court could have applied the Act instead of the state action
doctrine, arguably, the results would have been the same considering the
bad faith review.3 22
V. SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS
Since Patrick was decided, a number of lower courts have applied the
state action doctrine in cases dealing with physician staff privileges.3 23 Thus
far, no court has found a state statutory scheme to be comprehensive enough
to provide defendants immunity from antitrust liability, in light of the strict
standards set forth in Patrick. Essentially, the state statutory schemes fall
short under the second prong of the Midcal test-the active supervision
requirement. 24 For example, in Shahawy v. Harrison, the Eleventh Circuit
recently analyzed the Florida peer review statutory scheme in terms of the
active supervision requirement. 25 In that case, the court noted an abundance
319. Id.
320. Id.; see also George, supra note 78, at 402. Immunity from damages under federal
statutes is already effective. For state actions, the Act grants immunity only for actions
commenced on or after October 14, 1989. A state may elect to have immunity provisions apply
earlier. This would be accomplished by legislation. Id. In fact, Texas has adopted the provisions
of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act by legislation. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 4495b, § 5.06 (Vernon 1988). Oregon has not incorporated the provisions of the Act into
its legislation.
321. 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (Supp. V 1987).
322. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1507 (9th Cir. 1986) rev'd, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
323. Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., 880 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1989) (California defendants
not protected by state action doctrine); Shahawy v. Harrison, 875 F.2d 1529 (lth Cir. 1989)
(Florida statutory scheme and judicial review did not protect defendants from antitrust liability);
Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d 1273 (Ilth Cir. 1988) (Florida defendants not
protected by state action doctrine), vacated, 874 F.2d 755 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Jiricko v. Cofffeyville
Memorial Hosp. Medical Center, 700 F. Supp. 1599 (D. Kan. 1988) (Kansas defendants not
protected by state action doctrine).
324. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
325. 875 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989). In Shahawy, a physician, Mahfouz El Shahawy, and
his medical association filed suit against the Sarasota County Public Health Board, the hospital's
medical review committee members, and physicians on the hospital staff after he was denied
cardiac catheterization laboratory privileges. Id. at 1531. His original action alleged antitrust,
civil rights, racketeering, and state common law violations. Id. In this appeal, one of the issues
was whether the district court had erroneously granted summary judgement in favor of the
hospital board when it concluded that the state action doctrine immunized the hospital board
from federal antitrust liability. Id. at 1534.
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of Florida statutes dealing with the peer review process.126 However, the
court noted that one critical element was lacking-that is, no state official
reviewed peer review decisions to determine if they were in line with state
policy."' The court concluded that, in the absence of such active supervision
by a state actor, the Florida statutory scheme was insufficient to provide
immunity under the state action doctrine.32s Shahawy is consistent with
Patrick in holding that to satisfy the active supervision requirement, a state
actor must review peer review decisions on their merits.129 In fact, Patrick
goes one step further by suggesting that inherent in the review process is the
power and authority to change a decision that does not conform to state
policy. 3 0
Similarly, in Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd.,3"' a case analagous to Sha-
hawy, the Ninth Circuit recently examined the California peer review stat-
utory scheme and concluded that it too did not offer defendants immunity
from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine.33 2 As in Patrick, the
court's analysis was limited to the second prong of the Midcal test.333 The
Ninth Circuit found California's peer review statutes to be virtually identical
to those rejected by the Court in Patrick.334 According to the court, Cali-
fornia's peer review statutes fail to provide state action immunity because
326. Id. at 1535. Specifically, the court noted three Florida statutory provisions: (1) FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 395.011(6) (West 1986) required "all licensed facilities to set procedures and
standards for determining staff membership and clinical procedures." Id. at 1535; (2) FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 395.011(7) (West 1986) required "licensed facility which denies staff membership
or clinical privileges must provide an applicant with written reasons for such denial." Id.; and,
(3) FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.011(7) (West 1986) required that "hospital board must report any
denial of staff membership or clinical privileges to the state licensing board." Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
330. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988). "The active supervision prong . . . requires
that state officials have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private
parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy." Id.
331. 880 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1989). Dr. Pinhas was an ophthalmologist who contended that
his hospital staff privileges were wrongfully revoked by a peer review board when he refused
to sign a contract with the defendant. Id. at 1110. Pinhas filed suit against several different
defendants, including members of the peer review board, alleging violation of the antitrust laws
and his due process rights. Id. at 1111. One of the issues on appeal was the dismissal of Pinhas'
antitrust claim based on the state action doctrine. Id. at 1112.
332. Id. at 1113.
333. Id.
334. Id. The court concentrated on the activities of two California agencies. First, the State
Department of Health Services ("SDHS") was responsible for licensing and reviewing hospital
procedures. The court analogized the activities of the SDHS to those of the Oregon State
Health Division in Patrick. Id. Secondly, the California Board of Medical Quality Assurance's
("BMQA") primary function was to regulate and discipline physicians within the state. Any
adverse action taken by a hospital against a physician must be reported to the BMQA. The
court stated that the activities of the BMQA were similar to those of the BOME in Patrick.
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no state actor actively supervises or reviews procedures.335 Thus, the statutory
interpretation engaged in by the Pinhas court, like that of the Shahawy
court, is consistent with Patrick. Both Pinhas and Shahawy follow the strict
active supervision standards as set forth in Patrick. Unfortunately, even
though there are many examples of state statutory schemes that do not
satisfy the Patrick requirements, as yet, there is not a concrete example of
a peer review statutory scheme that is sufficient.
Because the Court in Patrick set such a strict standard for invoking the
state action doctrine in defense of antitrust challenges to peer review activ-
ities, more defendants named in those suits may instead attempt to assert
the jurisdictional defense.33 6 As previously stated, to raise that defense de-
fendants assert that their activities are inherently local, do not affect interstate
commerce and therefore fall outside of the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.
Defendants may or may not prevail with this argument.117 Since Patrick, at
least one defendant hospital has successfully raised the jurisdictional defense.
In Mitchell v. Frank R. Howard Memorial Hospital,33 a radiologist sued a
small, rural hospital after it entered into an exclusive arrangement agreement
with another radiologist.3 39 The Ninth Circuit affirmed a decision in favor
of the defendant hospital holding that its activities did not, as a matter of
law, have sufficient impact on interstate commerce to create jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act.3"' The Ninth Circuit weighed a variety of factors
and concluded that although this small, rural hospital might have purchased
some out of state supplies and received out of state insurance payments,
these factors alone were not sufficient to establish an impact on interstate
commerce.14' It remains to be seen if there will be an increase in the number
335. The SDHS, like the State Health Division in Patrick, had no authority to review hospital
staff decisions. Id. The BMQA, like the BOME in Patrick, had no authority to review the
outcome of peer review proceedings. Id.
336. See supra notes 89-92, 111-119 and accompanying text.
337. E.g., Pariser v. Christian Health Care Sys., Inc., 816 F.2d 1248, 1253 (8th Cir. 1987)
(no substantial effect on interstate commerce where 98%o of hospital's patients were Illinois
residents); Doe ex rel. Doe v. St*. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 417 (7th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff
did not allege facts sufficient to establish interstate nexus); Seglin v. Esau, 769 F.2d 1274, 1279
(7th Cir. 1985) (physician failed to allege facts to establish nexus with interstate commerce);
Cardio-Medical Assocs., v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 721 F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir. 1983)
(plaintiff met jurisdictional requirements of Sherman Act).
338. 853 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1123 (1989).
339. Id. at 763. Dr. Mitchell had an oral contract to provide radiology services to Howard
Memorial Hospital which was a 38 bed rural facility. After the hospital terminated the contract,
Dr. Mitchell sued under the Sherman Act.
340. Id. at 764. Dr. Mitchell unsuccessfully argued that because the hospital received a
substantial portion of its $5,000,000 annual revenues from out-of-state public and private
insurance programs, because the hospital purchased an unknown amount of medical supplies
from out-of-state sources, and because the radiology department alone generated over $600,000
a year in revenue, the hospital's activities, although local in nature, substantially affected
interstate commerce. Id.
341. Id. The court stated a sufficient impact on interstate commerce is measured by more
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of defendants asserting this jurisdictional defense in the aftermath of Pa-
trick. 342
VI. IMPACT
Three things are clear from the Patrick decision. First, the activities of
peer review committees may be subjected to a traditional antitrust analysis.31 3
Second, the state action doctrine may provide immunity for peer review
committees but only if the state or state actor provides for, and actively
supervises, the process.'" Finally, active supervision will be very difficult to
prove. If a state statute or regulatory practice is to meet the active supervision
prong of the Midcal test, it must provide the power of review and the power
of reversal to a state actor.345 Few, if any, statutory schemes meet this test.
The same is true of the limited methods of judicial review currently available.
As a result, peer review. committees will face additional exposure to antitrust
liability.
A. Applications
At first glance, after Patrick, lower courts may initially experience diffi-
culty in applying the state action doctrine.146 After holding that the state
action doctrine may be an effective immunity, the Court did not go through
a full Midcal analysis, but rather concentrated on the active supervision
requirement. Furthermore, lower courts are forced to engage in too much
statutory interpretation when applying the state action doctrine.147 These
interpretations may lead to conflicting decisions and confusion. Possible
examples include Marrese and Tambone, both Seventh Circuit decisions.3 41
than mere revenue figures such as receipt of insurance payments or purchasing of supplies from
out of state sources. The court stated:
[D]eterminations of [Sherman Act] jurisdiction [in hospital cases] are based not
merely upon revenue figures, but on a broad aggregate of factors including proximity
of the facility to regional centers of commerce or to other states, treatment of
significant numbers of out-of-state patients, purchase of equipment and supplies
from interstate sources and interstate transfer of payment for patient care.
Id.
342. Holthaus, Peer Review After Patrick is Alive and Well, HOSPITALS, Oct. 20, 1988, 34
(suggests that Mitchell, among other recent cases, offers hope for protection from antitrust
liability for peer group members).
343. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 99 (1988).
344. Id. at 101.
345. Id.
346. Lower courts seem to have no difficulty applying the principal set forth in Patrick. See
supra notes 323-42 and accompanying text.
347. See Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984) (Seventh Circuit analyzed
Indiana statutes to find state action); Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (1986) (Ninth Circuit
analyzed Oregon statutes to find state action), rev'd, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
348. See supra notes 160-99 and accompanying text.
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The Illinois and Indiana statutes in these decisions were very similar, but
the Seventh Circuit reached opposite conclusions in each case.149
However, a closer examination of the Patrick decision reveals that lower
courts really do have sufficient guidance in this area. 350 Regarding statutory
schemes, lower courts have the Court's analysis of the Oregon statutes
3 51
which ultimately proved to be insufficient in establishing immunity to phy-
sicians on peer review committees. To satisfy the state action doctrine, an
activity must be clearly articulated as state policy. 35
2
Also, to satisfy the state action doctrine active supervision by the state
must exist. State officials must have and exercise control over any anticom-
petitive acts and have the power to disapprove of those that contradict state
policy.35 3 If lower courts engage in an accurate application of the Midcal
test and follow the Court's reasoning in finding the Oregon statutes insuf-
ficient, conflicting decisions should not result. Furthermore, if the traditional
antitrust cases suggested in Patrick are utilized when trying to apply the
state action doctrine to peer review cases, statutory interpretation by lower
courts should be straightforward and consistent.
B. Policy Considerations
Arguably, after Patrick the threat of liability may deter physicians from
serving on committees or participating openly and honestly in peer review.
In Patrick, the Court failed to address the public policy argument that
subjecting peer review activities to antitrust liability would have an adverse
effect on the quality of medical care. 314 Respondents argued that subjecting
physicians to antitrust liability would prevent them from engaging openly
and actively in peer review.351 In response, the Court stated that an explo-
ration of these policy arguments is best left to Congress.35 6 The Court refused
to address the broader public policy issues and stated that the activities of
peer review committees would only be exempt if the state action doctrine is
satisfied .1 7
In fact, Congress has addressed these policy considerations in the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act. 58 With the Act, Congress intended to pro-
vide immunity to encourage participation on peer review committees, improve
the quality of medical care, prevent malpractice, and prevent incompetent
349. Id.
350. See supra notes 237-58 and accompanying text.
351. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 102-03.
352. Id. at 100.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 105.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 105-06.
358. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (Supp. V 1987). See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying
text.
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physicians from moving freely from state to state. 359 The effect of the Act
may neutralize the seemingly threatening holding of Patrick so that only
egregious peer review behavior will be susceptible to attack. The impact that
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act will have on this area is still
unknown. Perhaps the Act is the solution to the many problems in this
area. 36° When the Act becomes fully operational, state legislatures will not
have to worry about drafting comprehensive statutes that immunize physi-
cians on peer review committees. State courts will not have to analyze statutes
to see if they satisfy the Midcal test. Instead, the courts would simply need
to determine if the actions of a peer review committee met the standards set
forth in section 11112 of the Act.36' However, until courts have the oppor-
tunity to interpret the Act, the answers to these questions remain uncertain. 62
359. 42 U.S.C. § 11 101(a)(l)-(4) (Supp. 1987). See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
360. Several authorities have been critical of the Act. For example, one commentator has
noted that the scope of the Act is very narrow. Also, the procedural and reporting requirements
of the Act may be considered quite onerous. Finally, the Act "contains standards of 'reason-
ableness' that may allow a plaintiff to go to a jury to test the applicability of the Act alongside
of the antitrust allegations." Cross & Berman, supra note 295, at 19. See also Proger, Antitrust
Developments Affecting the Health Care Sector, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 315, 319 (1988) The author
states:
The Act, however, is not a panacea for hospitals and their medical staffs wishing
to escape federal antitrust challenges to their credentialing decisions. A plaintiff
may obtain injunctive relief and attorneys fees; the Act does not apply to peer
review actions involving allied health practitioners rather than physicians; the basis
for the peer review decision must have been the physician's professional competence
or conduct; and the initial determination of whether the damage immunity even
applies can necessitate an extremely broad (and thus expensive) factual inquiry,
which opens discovery to almost any question imaginable. Moreover, some of the
Act's due process requirements necessary to ensure that immunity applies, go beyond
protections required by some states and beyond those that result in efficient hospital
proceeding.
Compliance with the Act may necessitate amendment to medical staff bylaws,
which always raises sensitive political issues. Perhaps the Act's greatest effect will
be in providing a disincentive for plaintiffs and their attorneys to sue. In addition
to providing damage immunity in appropriate circumstances, the court must award
attorneys fees to defendants if the plaintiff's case was frivolous or brought in bad
faith.
Id.
361. See Baker, A Proposal for a Malice Barometer in Physician Peer Review: Twenty
Questions You Should Ask, 5 HoSPrrAL LAW NEWSLETTER (1988) (suggesting method of assessing
actions of peer review committee members for malice); George, supra note 78, at 401 (suggesting
checklist to insure compliance with the Act).
362. In footnote 8, the Court stated that if physicians thought the Act provided them with
insufficient immunity, they would have to take that matter up with Congress. Patrick, 486 U.S.
at 105 n.8.
No immunity is given with respect to peer review involving nonphysicians. See George, supra
note 78, at 401. No immunity is granted for actions seeking injunctive relief brought by the
government or from actions alleging violations of civil rights law. Id. Also, a state may opt
out of the Act by legislation. Id.
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As to the actual chilling effect of the Patrick holding, studies have begun
to show that physicians are aware of this decision and its effect on their
willingness to participate in peer review is of varying degrees. For example,
in a recent study by the Texas Medical Association on peer review practices,
sixteen percent of responding physicians said that the possibility of a lawsuit
makes them very reluctant to participate in peer review. a63 An additional
fifty-one percent of the respondents were somewhat reluctant to participate. 364
Furthermore, fifty-seven percent of the physicians surveyed said they would
be more likely to participate if they had legal immunity.3 65
If read carefully, however, Patrick will probably not have a chilling effect
on peer review. The Court recognized the physicians on Columbia Hospital's
peer review committee acted in bad faith.166 The Patrick decision might have
been very different if the clinic physicians had acted with integrity. Patrick
sends the covert message to the medical community that only good faith
peer review will be tolerated. 367 This is not to suggest that good faith review
will always enjoy immunity from antitrust liability. However, good faith is
one factor a court may look at in determining liability.3 61
Finally, once physicians realize that the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act of 1986 is in effect, they may relax about the negative implications of
the Patrick decision. To avoid liability for their actions, peer review com-
mittee members need only act in good faith. If they do so, they may be
protected by state and federal immunity statutes. If they do not, they should
face the consequences of their actions.
VII. CONCLUSION
After Patrick, it is clear that peer review committee activities may be the
subject of federal antitrust claims. Moreover, although the state action
363. Ross, Peer Review in Texas-A Survey of Medical Staffs, 83 TEX. MED. 91, 92 (Mar.
1987).
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 98 n.3. The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit had found the
respondents' conduct to be "shabby, unprincipled, and unprofessional." Id.
367. In September of 1988, five physicians at Children's Memorial Hospital in Chicago,
Illinois were surveyed regarding the Patrick decision. Those surveyed included Dr. Margaret
O'Flynn M.D., Chief of Staff, Dr. John Raffensperger M.D., Chief of Surgery, Dr. G.W.
Stevenson M.D., anesthesiologist, Dr. Steven Hall M.D., anesthesiologist, and Dr. Lauren
Holinger M.D., Division Head of Ear, Nose, & Throat Department. Every physician had heard
of the Patrick decision. No physician seemed concerned that his or her peer review group
involvement would subject him or her to antitrust liability. At least two physicians stated that
Patrick simply meant they should act in good faith. Survey by Susan Capra, Children's Memorial
Hospital, Chicago, Illinois (Sept. 1988).
368. Koska, Proper Procedures Are Key to Peer Review Legality Experts Say, HOSPITALS,
June 20, 1988, at 65. The author recommends that physicians engaging in peer review may
limit their legal risk to antitrust liability if they avoid bad faith and follow sound hospital
bylaws. Id.
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doctrine may continue to offer immunity to peer review committees, this is
true only if the Midcal test has been satisfied. Patrick has made the Midcal
test more difficult to pass. However, the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act of 1986 may provide additional protections which negate the effects of
Patrick. With the various immunity statutes, physicians may not be chilled
from participation on these important committees. However, Patrick tells
the medical community that only good faith reviews are acceptable.
The Patrick decision changes little; it merely defines a stricter standard
for antitrust immunity under the state action doctrine. Health care profes-
sionals may be understandably concerned. However, as the medical profes-
sion continues to take on the characteristics of big business, perhaps it should
also assume the responsibilities. One of those responsibilities is to comply
with the federal antitrust laws. The ultimate impact of this decision is to
encourage good faith peer review decisions. This result can only benefit all
involved.
Susan Capra

